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A Fourth Amendment violation has traditionally involved a physical intru-
sion such as the search of a house or the seizure of a person or her papers.  Today, 
investigators rarely need to break down doors, rummage through drawers, or in-
vade one’s peace and repose to obtain incriminating evidence in an investigation.  
 
†
 Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights at Stanford Law School, Stan-
ford University; Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Philosophy, Van-
derbilt University.  B.A., Dartmouth College; M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Duke University; A.L.M., 
Harvard University.  Member, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Is-
sues.  Thanks to Lisa Schultz Bressman, I. Glenn Cohen, Hon. Frank Easterbrook, Bar-
bara Fried, Paul Goldstein, Hank Greely, Orin Kerr, Mark Kelman, Larry Kramer, Mark 
Lemley, Thede Loder, Peter Menell, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, David Sklansky, 
Christopher Slobogin, Robert Weisberg, and the workshop participants at the Stanford 
Law School Faculty Workshop Series, the Chicago Law School Public Law Series, and 
the Harvard Law School Petrie-Flom Colloquium series for their comments and sugges-
tions on earlier drafts.  The author is grateful for the excellent research assistance of 
Eva Dossier, Clare Hatfield, Joseph Kimok, Stephanie Kostiuk, Rachael McClure, 
Dustin Paige, Govind Persad, and Feras Sadik.  All opinions expressed in this Article 
are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of any institution, entity, or organiza-
tion with which she is affiliated. 
Farahany FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/17/2012 1:03 PM 
1240 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1239 
Instead, the government may unobtrusively intercept information from electronic 
files, GPS transmissions, and intangible communications.  In the near future, it 
may even be possible to intercept information directly from suspects’ brains.  Courts 
and scholars have analogized modern searches for information to searches of tangi-
ble property like containers and have treated protected information like the “content” 
inside.  That metaphor is flawed because it focuses exclusively on whether infor-
mation is secluded and assigns no value to the substantive information itself. 
This Article explores the descriptive potential of intellectual property law as a 
metaphor to describe current Fourth Amendment search and seizure law.  It ap-
plies this new metaphor to identifying, automatic, memorialized, and uttered evi-
dence to solve current riddles and predict how the Fourth Amendment will apply 
to emerging technology.  Unlike real property law, intellectual property law recog-
nizes that who authored information—and not just how or where it was stored—
informs the individual interests at stake in that information.  The exclusive rights 
of authors, including nondisclosure, are interests recognized by copyright law.  
Recognizing the secrecy interests of individuals has broad implications for the 
Fourth Amendment in the information age.  Together with real property law, an 
intellectual property law metaphor better describes emerging doctrine, which has 
required greater government justification to search certain categories of infor-
mation.  But it also reveals the normative shortcomings of current doctrine when 
the secrets the government seeks are automatically generated information that aris-
es from computer activities, via GPS tracking, or are emitted by our brains. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Can you keep a secret?  Under the Fourth Amendment, that de-
pends on whether it’s yours to keep.  The Fourth Amendment guaran-
tees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1  
Fourth Amendment protections arose from physical intrusions upon 
personal property but have evolved to protect “people, not places” 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2  Those protections apply 
even if the investigative technique requires no physical trespass upon 
protected property.  Such is often the case in modern criminal investi-
gations, which can proceed without physical intrusion upon a suspect’s 
person, house, papers, and effects or even her concurrent awareness.  
The objects of modern searches are often intangible information stored 
in computers, electronic communications, or the suspect’s own brain. 
Government investigations to obtain information implicate the 
Fourth Amendment only if the investigation intrudes upon the lawful 
privacy interests of individuals.  Those interests—individuals’ “reason-
able expectations of privacy”3—depend on the interests that society 
recognizes through law and custom.  Traditionally, courts have relied 
on property law to inform reasonable expectations of privacy in Fourth 
Amendment searches.  This Article explores how intellectual property 
law may better explain current doctrine concerning searches and sei-
zures of informational property. 
The government can already obtain incriminating information 
from our emails, our phone calls, and our Internet searches.  Recent 
advances in neuroscience foretell that thoughts and images in our 
brains could become the target of future government investigations.  
Despite these technological advances of the information age, current 
Fourth Amendment doctrine affords us little if any protection against 
searches of our intangible effects. 
Even though the Fourth Amendment touchstone evolved from 
property to people and their privacy, analogies to the paradigmatic 
physical search still have a powerful hold on the judicial mind.  The 
focus on physical trespass upon property has muddled judicial review 
of modern searches and has led to persistent and ever-growing confu-
sion over the scope of the individual interests at stake.  Scholars have 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
3 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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resigned themselves to believing that Supreme Court Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine is incoherent, with little sense to be made of recent cases.  
Worse yet, the focus on physical trespass has obfuscated the far more 
relevant metaphor of intellectual property law, which holds greater 
descriptive power and relevance. 
Fourth Amendment claimants were historically concerned with vio-
lent physical intrusions upon their persons and their houses or forced 
disclosure of their papers.  As investigative techniques have shifted from 
brute force to sense-enhanced and surreptitious searches, individuals 
are much less likely to be subjected to government violence against their 
tangible property.  Modern complaints focus on the nondisclosure of 
personal information, their papers, and their effects.4  Along with this 
shifting landscape of Fourth Amendment claims, a default explanation 
has emerged from judicial opinions and scholarship about when an 
individual has a cognizable Fourth Amendment privacy interest in 
searches of informational property.  That explanation dichotomizes 
“content” and “no-content” information and protects the former but 
not the latter.5  But applying the tangible property concept of con-
tent/no-content lacks descriptive coherence and normative grounding 
when applied to searches of intangible informational property. 
Courts and scholars have applied this approach to classify email 
addresses and telephone numbers as content-free information,6 and 
the body of emails or content of telephone conversations as content-
rich.  Warrantless investigations of the former have been found rea-
sonable, while warrantless investigations of the latter have been 
deemed per se unreasonable.  The intuition that email addresses are 
different from the content of email messages is sound, but the doctri-
nal categories used to distinguish between them are not.  These differ-
ent types of information do implicate different privacy interests, but 
not because phone numbers dialed always lack “content.” 
The different privacy interests that individuals hold in phone 
numbers, email addresses, email messages, or their thoughts and 
memories can be better understood by broadening the sources of law 
invoked to determine reasonable expectations of privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment.  This Article explores how the Court already relies im-
plicitly upon intellectual property law to understand reasonable expec-
 
4 See infra Section I.A. 
5 See infra Section I.B. 
6 See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
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tations of privacy.  The Court has recognized Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy interests that are best described as arising from the rights of indi-
viduals to exclude others from their expressions as part of the bundle 
of rights accorded them by intellectual property law.  Just as real prop-
erty law has traditionally informed expectations of privacy in searches 
of tangible property, intellectual property law may also inform the ex-
pectations of privacy in searches of informational property. 
Others before me have persuasively demonstrated that not all ele-
ments of the Fourth Amendment fit neatly into a single, internally 
consistent theory.  Although I agree, an increasingly consistent pattern 
has developed pertaining to the individual interests the Court has rec-
ognized in searches or seizures of intangible information.  That pat-
tern, which has received little attention from academic scholarship, 
becomes evident when considering the exclusive rights of individuals 
that arise from intellectual property law. 
The right to exclude others in intellectual property law better ac-
counts for current doctrine about searches of informational property 
than does real property law.  Intellectual property law distinguishes be-
tween the rights of authors and the rights of mere possessors of infor-
mation, a distinction equally relevant in the Fourth Amendment 
context.  Asking who authored the information focuses the inquiry on 
whose and what type of Fourth Amendment privacy interests are at 
stake.  Individuals have a cognizable right to nondisclosure of their 
information when they have authored or originated it.  Authors can 
properly claim a “secrecy interest” in “their” writings and effects.  Mere 
possessors of information have the right to exclude others from their 
own copies of the information, but authors have an additional right to 
secure the substantive secrecy of informational content.7  Recognizing 
that Fourth Amendment privacy interests can arise from both property 
and intellectual property rights helps to resolve both old and new rid-
dles in Fourth Amendment law.  Searches and seizures of private pa-
pers and surreptitious searches of thoughts and memories all implicate 
an author’s interest in secrecy. 
This Article explores the descriptive potential of an intellectual 
property law metaphor for understanding Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure law and its normative implication.  Part I places the discus-
sion in context by explaining the underpinnings of Fourth Amend-
ment law, tracing the doctrinal development that has resulted in the 
 
7 See infra subsection II.A.2. 
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reliance on property law to inform expectations of privacy.  Part II de-
velops the until-now overlooked descriptive metaphor of intellectual 
property for assessing whether a Fourth Amendment violation has oc-
curred in the search or seizure of informational property.  It focuses 
by example on copyright law and the exclusive rights of authors and 
explains how intellectual property law better describes the reasona-
bleness inquiry for modern searches and seizures.  Part III then applies 
this approach to the spectrum of evidence introduced in my compan-
ion article, Incriminating Thoughts.8  This application aligns current 
doctrine with an intellectual property metaphor and illustrates how 
this new framework predicts when one will have a cognizable secrecy 
interest, in addition to the traditional seclusion interest that typically 
informs the reasonableness of searches and seizures.  Part III also dis-
cusses cases that do not fit the pattern and speculates about the basis 
for deviations in those cases.  Finally, Part IV examines whether an 
intellectual property metaphor aligns with societal expectations of pri-
vacy in an era where electronic, digital, and even brain-based thoughts 
may be searched. 
Two caveats frame this discussion.  First, I am not arguing that intel-
lectual property law ought to guide all Fourth Amendment decisions.  
Instead, I wish to explore the descriptive potential of intellectual 
property law in the Fourth Amendment context.  Second, in drawing 
on the constitutional analogy to the Copyright Clause, I do not claim 
that those who authored and ratified the Fourth Amendment imag-
ined that the Copyright Clause should inform the reasonableness of 
searches and seizures.  My claim is simply that an intellectual property 
metaphor holds greater descriptive potential than real property law 
alone in searches of informational property. 
I.  EXISTING FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORKS 
A.  Property to Privacy and Back Again 
In its first major case interpreting the Search and Seizure Clause of 
the Fourth Amendment,9 the United States Supreme Court articulated 
the then-prevailing view that the Fourth Amendment balances indi-
 
8 Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012). 
9 The Search and Seizure Clause, the first clause of the Fourth Amendment, provides, 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Farahany FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 1:03 PM 
2012] Searching Secrets  1245 
vidual property interests against the societal need for the evidence 
sought.10  The sacrosanct nature of property interests demanded justi-
fication even for “bruising grass” on one’s property.11  In this context, 
an “unreasonable” search meant the use of general warrants to in-
fringe on an individual’s property interest.12  Since then, property law 
has held a stranglehold on Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
In due time, the Court confronted modern investigative tech-
niques that allowed investigators to obtain evidence without any physi-
cal interference or trespass upon a person’s real property.  In the 
earliest of such cases, Olmstead v. United States, police placed a wiretap 
on “ordinary telephone wires from the residences of four of the peti-
tioners.”13  Because the wiretap was placed outside of the suspect’s 
property, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment search had oc-
curred.14  Instead, the Court held that “voluntary conversations secretly 
overheard” are not tangible property or “material things” that the 
Fourth Amendment protects.15  The phone taps did not intrude upon 
any tangible property interest that Olmstead held, so no search of his 
home, curtilage, or papers had occurred.16  
Justice Brandeis dissented, echoing themes that he had developed 
in a Harvard Law Review article long before.17  In a prophetic passage, 
he imagined a future that is now almost upon us: 
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without re-
moving papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by 
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences 
of the home.  Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring 
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . . Can 
 
10 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (stating that the “sacred and 
incommunicable” right of property is only set aside “for the good of the whole” (quot-
ing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.) 1066 (Eng.))). 
11 Id. (quoting Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066). 
12 David A. Sullivan, A Bright Line in the Sky?:  Toward a New Fourth Amendment Search 
Standard for Advancing Surveillance Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 971 (2002); see also 
Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 
189 (1977) (stating that while early Fourth Amendment doctrine was not designed to 
protect property rights, property law came to define the scope of the privilege). 
13 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
14 Id. at 464-65. 
15 Id. at 464. 
16 Id. at 456-57, 466. 
17 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 207 (1890) (arguing for greater protections of “the right to one’s personality”). 
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Brandeis thought not.  He argued that the Fourth Amendment 
protects against “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon 
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed.”19  His 
dissent was prescient in realizing a future in which physically unobtru-
sive searches can occur.  Furthermore, he foreshadowed the doctrinal 
shift in Fourth Amendment cases from one concerned only with tres-
pass upon property to one in which individual privacy is the prime in-
terest at stake.20 
In Katz v. United States, the Court addressed whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to intangible private conversations held in a pub-
lic glass-enclosed phone booth.21  FBI agents attached a device to the 
outside of a public telephone booth to listen to the defendant’s con-
versations.22  The Government argued that this eavesdropping did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment because no trespass upon the de-
fendant’s property occurred and because the defendant voluntarily 
held his conversation in a public place.23  But the Court pointedly re-
jected the idea that “constitutionally protected areas” are a “talismanic 
solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.”24  Instead, what an 
individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”25  Justice Harlan con-
curred and proposed the expectation-of-privacy analysis 26  that the 
Court eventually adopted in Smith v. Maryland.27  This two-pronged 
privacy test finds that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when an 
individual has a subjective expectation of privacy that society recog-
nizes as reasonable.28 
 
18 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 478. 
20 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (affirming that the 
Fourth Amendment protects communications one seeks to preserve as private and 
dismissing the claim that a search requires physical trespass upon property). 
21 Id. at 348-49. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 351-53. 
24 Id. at 351 n.9.   
25 Id. at 351-52.   
26 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
27 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979). 
28 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
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The privacy test was originally meant to determine if there was an 
invasion of a Fourth Amendment interest.29  If so, a warrant was almost 
always required to justify a search.30  Today, the ex ante issuance of 
search warrants is the exception rather than the rule,31 so the core of 
Fourth Amendment analysis is an ex post assessment of the reasonable-
ness of the search that has already occurred.32  The Court now uses the 
Katz privacy test in two ways:  first, to ask whether the invaded interest 
is important enough to even constitute a “search,”33 and second, if a 
search has occurred, to determine its reasonableness by balancing in-
dividual interests against governmental and societal interests.  The 
Court has found lesser intrusions upon privacy reasonable without the 
ex ante issuance of a warrant.34  Whether as an ex ante analysis (asking 
if a warrant should issue) or as an ex post assessment (asking after the 
investigation if the intrusion was a search and also unreasonable), the 
focus of a Fourth Amendment inquiry is on whether an unlawful intru-
sion upon individual interests has occurred. 
Most recently, in United States v. Jones, the Court revisited its prop-
erty-invasion-as-privacy rationale, holding that the government’s instal-
lation of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle constitutes a 
search subject to the Fourth Amendment.35  Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, emphasized that the government had “physically occu-
pied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”36  In-
 
29 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 
1291 ( Johnny H. Killian et al. eds., 2004). 
30 Id. 
31 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 
922 (1991) (stating that, in practice, warrants are required only for wiretaps and 
searches of homes or offices). 
32 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (“The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801 (1994) (“The core of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness.”). 
33 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (noting that “[i]n assessing 
when a search is not a search,” the Court has “applied somewhat in reverse” Katz’s pri-
vacy test by holding that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur when the indi-
vidual lacks either a subjective or a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
34 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 29, at 1313 (“While the Supreme Court 
stresses the importance of warrants and has repeatedly referred to searches without 
warrants as ‘exceptional,’ it appears that the greater number of searches . . . take place 
without warrant.” (footnote omitted)). 
35 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
36 Id. 
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voking Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington37 and the text of 
the Fourth Amendment itself, Justice Scalia echoed the significance of 
property rights to search and seizure analysis.38  Although acknowledg-
ing that the Court had expanded beyond a strictly property-based ap-
proach in Katz, the opinion nevertheless emphasized that property 
rights remain the central source of individual interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.39  While the police could have obtained the 
same result in Jones without a physical trespass, and such an intrusion 
might still be unconstitutional under Katz, the facts in Jones did not 
require the Court to resolve that question.40  Moreover, since the gov-
ernment took the position that the GPS tracking did not constitute a 
search, the Court left for another day the further question of which in-
dividual interests, beyond intrusion upon property, an individual could 
claim to assess the reasonableness of the search that had occurred. 
Justice Sotomayor, concurring with the opinion, and Justice Alito, 
concurring with the result, highlighted the limitations of focusing just 
on property-based interests in searches of informational property.  Jus-
tice Sotomayor underscored that physical intrusions are rarely neces-
sary or likely in government investigations for information.41  Whether 
through factory-installed GPS technology or surveillance of electronic 
signals transmitted by computers, cell phones, or even our brains, the 
government may obtain “a precise, comprehensive record of a per-
son’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her famil-
ial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” without 
ever committing a physical trespass.42  Similarly, Justice Alito found the 
majority’s focus on trespass problematic, concluding the Katz expecta-
tion of privacy analysis to be better, though “not without its own difficul-
ties.”43  Yet he expressed doubt as to whether case law could keep pace 
with rapidly changing technology, suggesting instead that individual 
interests might be more easily defined and protected by legislation.44 
What remains after Jones is an incomplete description of which in-
dividual interests beyond real property intrusions the Fourth Amend-
 
37 (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.) (Eng.). 
38 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
39 Id. at 950. 
40 Id. at 954. 
41 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)  
44 Id. at 962-64. 
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ment protects.  At the very least, Jones repudiates the view that Katz was 
“a shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudential paradigms from a prop-
erty-based framework to an expectation-of-privacy framework.”45  Real 
property law remains central to Fourth Amendment individual interests.  
But the Jones majority also emphasized that trespass upon property and 
the Katz expectation of privacy test coexist in Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.  Unfortunately, the Katz Court treated “the meaning of pri-
vacy as too obvious to merit extended discussion.”46  But fifty years later 
and with new dueling opinions in Jones, the meaning of privacy re-
mains anything but obvious.47 
B.  The Content/No-Content Approach 
The concurrences in Jones underscored that in the information age, 
defendants are less concerned about intrusions upon their real prop-
erty and more concerned about intrusions upon their information.  
When the police search a cell phone, for example, few defendants 
complain that the police physically opened their cell phones and 
searched the microprocessors, the batteries, or other internal parts.  
Their primary concern is that the police searched the information 
stored in the cell phone memory:  call histories, text messages, emails, 
documents, photographs, and other data.  Their privacy interests cen-
ter on the information in the memory and not the physical contents 
inside the casing of the phone.  Put simply, intrusion upon real 
property is not the primary concern of the modern Fourth Amend-
ment complainant. 
In Smith v. Maryland,48 the Court laid the foundation for extending 
the traditional property-based protections to modern searches of in-
tangible information.  The Court held that the government’s use of a 
pen register—a device that records the phone numbers one dials—was 
not a Fourth Amendment search.49  Using a content/no-content dichot-
omy as its guide, the Court explained that “a pen register differs signifi-
 
45 Sullivan, supra note 12, at 974. 
46 Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. 
CT. REV. 173, 186. 
47 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479-81 (2006) 
(collecting sources expressing and exemplifying the vagueness of the concept of privacy). 
48 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
49 See id. at 745-46. 
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cantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do 
not acquire the contents of communications.”50  
Courts, scholars, and the executive branch51 have built upon Smith 
to argue that the content/no-content distinction should apply to 
searches of computers and their electronic contents.  This approach 
treats information on the “outside” of an envelope, container, or com-
puter file as no-content information, and information on the “inside” 
of the envelope, container, or computer file as content information.  
From Supreme Court cases on pen registers52 to lower court cases con-
cerning cell phones,53 emails,54 and IP addresses,55 treating informa-
tional searches like physical searches of real property has taken hold.  
 
50 Id. at 741. 
51 For example, 
 Justice Department officials have told members of Congress that Smith v. Mary-
land authorizes federal agents to use Carnivore’s pen mode application without 
triggering Fourth Amendment protections.  According to this interpretation, feder-
al agents use Carnivore to conduct pen register searches because they believe that 
the addresses found in the TO and FROM lines of an e-mail are the electronic 
equivalent of the numbers dialed on a telephone. 
Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology:  Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the 
Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 127-28 (2002) (footnote omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  The FBI and numerous courts have also applied the content/no-
content distinction to authorize Internet pen registers to capture the “to” and “from” 
fields in email messages.  Anthony E. Orr, Note, Marking Carnivore’s Territory:  Rethinking 
Pen Registers on the Internet, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 226 (2002).  
52 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (“[I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscrib-
ers . . . harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”). 
53 See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[U]sers . . . have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their text mes-
sages vis-a-vis the service provider.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
54 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that using computer surveillance techniques that revealed the “to” and “from” addresses 
of email messages, addresses of websites the defendant had visited, and the total 
amount of data transmitted to or from defendant’s Internet account did not amount to 
a “search” in violation of Fourth Amendment); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 
190 (2d Cir. 2004) (analogizing the privacy expectations of an email user to the expec-
tations of an individual communicating by regular mail); United States v. Maxwell, 45 
M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (remarking that the sender of an email, like someone 
who sends a letter by mail, generally “enjoys a reasonable expectation that police offi-
cials will not intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant”). 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that 
“no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, because that information 
is . . . conveyed to and, indeed, from third parties”); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-
4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (concluding that information 
furnished to an Internet service provider in creating an email account is “non-content 
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When investigators seek only no-content information—things out-
side of the container—this framework implies that no Fourth Amend-
ment search has occurred.  Professor Orin Kerr has argued that this 
outside/inside distinction translates easily to modern informational 
content:  “[A]ddressing (or ‘envelope’) information is the data that the 
network uses to deliver the communications to or from the user; the 
content information is the payload that the user sends or receives.”56  
Applying the same framework to electronic communications, Kerr 
explained, 
In the case of e-mail, for example, the subject line, the body of the mes-
sage, and any attachments count as the contents of the communication.  
They are the actual message to be sent.  Everything else in the e-mail, in-
cluding the to/from address and the size of the e-mail, counts as non-
content information.  Internet IP headers provide another easy case.  
Computers generate IP headers to deliver Internet communications, and 
most Internet users remain blissfully unaware of their existence.  The 
headers are therefore non-content information rather than the contents 
of communications.  Other examples may be more difficult, but these 
important cases are straightforward.57 
This description has intuitive appeal and suggests two unarticulated ra-
tionales that might support using the content/no-content framework 
to determine when a “search” for information has occurred:  the user’s 
awareness of the information created and the user’s intent to create a 
communication.  But neither explanation has been offered in support 
of this dichotomy, and aside from the ability to reuse the existing 
property framework, it is unclear what normative purpose the dichot-
omy achieves.  
There are other substantial descriptive and normative shortcom-
ings in applying a content/no-content approach to determine when a 
Fourth Amendment search of protected information has occurred.  
Consider the problems presented by ubiquitous automated phone sys-
tems.  Imagine that the police have attached a pen register to a sus-
 
information” that does not give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy); State v. 
Mello, 27 A.3d 771, 775 (N.H. 2011) (“We . . . conclude that a defendant has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information provided to an Internet 
service provider.”); State v. Simmons, 27 A.3d 1065, 1068 (Vt. 2011) (“Vermont’s 
Constitution affords no privacy protection in an internet service provider’s subscriber 
address or use information disclosing noncontent data.”). 
56 Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:  A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1019 (2010). 
57 Id. at 1030 (footnote omitted). 
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pect’s phone line to capture the numbers as she dials them from her 
phone.  While enjoying the solitude of her own home, the suspect calls 
into her bank, dialing 1-800-4MY-BANK.  The phone rings, and an au-
tomated voice says, 
Please enter your customer access number or social security number. 
The suspect enters her six-digit customer access number, 012345.  Af-
ter a brief pause, the automated voice gives the following choices: 
For banking information press “1.”  For a representative, press “2.” 
The suspect dials “2.”  The suspect’s conversation is then connected to 
a live voice.  In the meantime, the pen register has recorded 1-800-
4MY-BANK-012345-2.  The content/no-content dichotomy predicts 
that the numbers 0-1-2-3-4-5-2 are phone numbers and therefore no-
content information.  Yet the suspect dialed 0-1-2-3-4-5-2 in response 
to prompts, just as she might answer questions in a conversation with a 
bank representative.  This presents a Catch-22 for content/no-content 
proponents:  either 0-1-2-3-4-5-2 is not content, which is plainly wrong, 
or it is content, which undermines the dichotomy.  If it is content, then 
numbers are being classified by context rather than location or form.   
The dichotomy also fails to value information as a reasonable per-
son would, that is, based on its substance rather than merely its loca-
tion.  With the content/no-content approach, individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of informational privacy that will implicate 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny based solely on whether they seclude in-
formation.  The dichotomy treats all information on the “inside” as 
equally valuable, and, likewise, all information on the “outside” as 
equally valueless.  Thus, when the government intercepts content in-
formation—whether a cooking recipe or a criminal confession—the 
government will have equally intruded upon the seclusion of those 
effects.  And while the analogy draws nicely on the existing protection 
afforded to sealed letters58 entrusted to the post office,59 whether in-
 
58 Whether the comparison between electronic and traditional modes of commu-
nication is appropriate is outside the scope of this Article.  Are emails like sealed letters, 
with only addresses visible to Internet service providers (ISP), or are they more like 
postcards, where both the address and content are visible to the world?  In his amicus 
brief in United States v. Bach, Professor Kerr drew this conclusion:   
 Unlike the traditional telephone network and postal mail system, however, 
the Internet does not treat content and non-content information differently.  
The content is not sealed; both content and non-content information are dis-
closed to the ISP in a steady stream of data.  While a casual user may think of e-
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formation is visible or invisible, tangible or intangible, or sealed or 
unsealed are all “distinctions without a difference” when it comes to 
the substantive secrecy of the information at issue.60 
Kerr recognizes that this model has limitations but asks, “What 
other line is superior?  What precisely are the realistic alternatives?”61  
Likewise, the Court has recognized that the dichotomy cannot explain 
whether and which details may be more intimate than others.62  As 
Kerr himself acknowledges, “[C]ourts should focus on . . . infor-
mation rather than the physical storage device that happens to contain 
it.”63  As it turns out, the Copyright Clause of the Constitution already 
guides us to do so. 
II.  PERSONS, PAPERS, AND THEIR EFFECTS 
A.  Copyright and the Fourth Amendment 
Copyright law and its protection of the exclusive rights of authors 
have gone almost entirely unnoticed in Fourth Amendment scholarship.  
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”64  These “exclusive Rights to . . . Writings” 
inform authors’ reasonable expectations of privacy and provide a use-
 
mail as the equivalent of sealed postal mail, in fact e-mail works more like a post-
card:  the content of the message is openly visible to the operators of the network. 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr in Support of the Appellant at 6, Unit-
ed States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1238), 2002 WL 32139374 
(citation omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that letters and sealed 
packages “are as fully guarded from examination and inspection . . . as if they were 
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles”). 
60 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 1927) (Rudkin, J., 
dissenting)). 
61 Kerr, supra note 56, at 1032. 
62 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (noting 
that aerial photographs taken by the EPA of a chemical plant were not “so revealing of 
intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns” but that a device capable of record-
ing confidential discussions of chemical formulas would raise more serious questions). 
63 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 556 
(2005). 
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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ful metaphor for understanding “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their . . . papers, and effects.”65 
The parallel between the two clauses pertains to the key possessive 
in each, which secures personal rights to individuals.  The Fourth 
Amendment guarantees to the people the right “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects.”  And the Copyright Clause simi-
larly guarantees to authors and inventors “the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”  The first possessive has animated 
much of Fourth Amendment doctrine because courts turn to state 
property law to determine whether individuals can properly claim that 
the houses, papers, or effects searched were their own.66  But the paral-
lel possessive in the Copyright Clause has escaped notice in search and 
seizure doctrine.  This Section demonstrates that intellectual property 
law analogously informs the reasonable expectation of privacy in writ-
ings or intangible effects. 
The Court has held that the constitutionality of a search turns in 
part on whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
place or thing searched.67  Whether an expectation of privacy is rea-
sonable or not has always turned on bodies of law outside of the 
Fourth Amendment.68  Privacy expectations are reflected in laws or 
societal norms, so a reasonable expectation of privacy “must have a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to con-
cepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”69  And the most consistently rec-
ognized subjective and objective expectation of privacy is one that de-
rives, at least in part, “from the right to exclude others from the 
property in question.”70 
 
65 Id. amend. IV. 
66 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 811 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment 
rights track the right to exclude others under state property law.”). 
67 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
68 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (“[O]ur very definition of 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ . . . we have said [is] an expectation ‘that has a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understanding that are recognized and permitted by 
society.’” (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1988))). 
69 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).  
70 United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 143 n.12). 
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It is state property law that establishes the right to exclude others.71  
Protection of the home, for example, receives the most stringent 
Fourth Amendment protection because of the attendant right to ex-
clude others.72  Lawful possession under state property law provides 
“an important consideration in determining whether a defendant had 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.”73 
But real property law is not the only source of a right to exclude 
others.  Intellectual property law likewise confers a right to exclude 
others to qualified individuals.  Of course, the norms underlying the 
right to exclude others in real property law differ from the norms 
underlying that right in intellectual property law.  Real property rights 
are designed to ensure the productive use of real property but also 
include a crucial privacy dimension for individuals by enabling them 
to exclude others from their physical space.  Intellectual property law, 
by contrast, is generally understood as a mechanism to encourage the 
disclosure of inventions and writings to society, rather than a mecha-
nism to secure the privacy of authors.  Nevertheless, common law cop-
yright historically included within it a strong privacy dimension, just as 
real property law does today.  And safeguarding authors’ secrecy pro-
motes the progress of knowledge by giving authors an enclave to ex-
press, edit, and decide which expressions to share.  Had J.K. Rowling 
lacked a right of nondisclosure in her privately kept expressions, for 
example, she would have had little recourse if someone had obtained 
and disclosed a summary of the finale before she published the final 
book in the Harry Potter series.  The economic value of the series was 
enhanced by her privacy and ability to choose what, when, and wheth-
er to disclose her expressions. 
Individuals have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest when 
the government trespasses on real property, not because real property 
 
71 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (noting that the 
right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property”); see also id. at 179-80 (relying on state property 
law in upholding a landowner’s right to exclude against the government’s attempt to 
impose a navigational servitude).  
72 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“[P]hysical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment was directed.” (quoting 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385, 391 (1978) (holding that one does not forfeit her Fourth Amendment rights 
to her home by committing a crime); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 
(1969) (linking property rights to the ability to raise a motion to exclude evidence 
based upon the Fourth Amendment). 
73 Lyons, 992 F.2d at 1031. 
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law includes a right to privacy but because property law includes a 
right to exclude others.  In other words, the relevant analogy between 
real property and intellectual property in the Fourth Amendment is 
the individual’s right to exclude others from the property intruded 
upon.  Just as real property law informs searches that invade physical 
property, intellectual property law—particularly common law intellec-
tual property law—may serve as a framework for assessing Fourth 
Amendment interests in the search of intellectual property.  
At first glance, it may seem odd that the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment interests might be partially contingent on the exercise of state 
power.  But in fact, the scope of many constitutional rights is contingent 
on nonconstitutional bodies of law.  For example, the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits both the deprivation of property without due process and the 
taking of private property without just compensation, but state law gen-
erally defines “property” for Fifth Amendment purposes.74  This does 
not mean that state law is dispositive or that states can define these con-
stitutional rights out of existence; ultimately the meaning of constitu-
tional “property” is a federal question.75  But within broad parameters, 
state law informs the scope of the constitutional right. 
Likewise, in the Fourth Amendment context, nonconstitutional 
law informs the reasonableness of a search.  The Court has tied Fourth 
Amendment interests to what society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable.76  The right to exclude others from property has until now 
served as the primary legal referent.77  This is not to say that all Fourth 
 
74 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 487 (6th ed. 2009) (“The cases take the view that, 
in general, the question whether a ‘property’ interest exists is governed by state law.”). 
75 Id. at 488. 
76 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
77 See Kerr, supra note 66, at 809-10 (“[T]he basic contours of modern Fourth 
Amendment doctrine are largely keyed to property law.  Although the phrase ‘reasona-
ble expectation of privacy’ sounds mystical, in most (though not all) cases, an expecta-
tion of privacy becomes ‘reasonable’ only when it is backed by a right to exclude 
borrowed from real property law.”). 
Professor Christopher Slobogin has offered an intriguing proportionality principle 
of privacy in Fourth Amendment cases, using empirical results about what “society” 
finds invasive to define the lawful interests underlying privacy.  See CHRISTOPHER SLO-
BOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 33 (2007) (asserting that “some assessment of societal attitudes about the 
relative intrusiveness of police actions” should be part of the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness analysis).  Particularly when information lacks a referent as to “how private 
[those] . . . activities or records are,” “surveys of the population should be considered 
relevant” in determining societal expectations of privacy.  Christopher Slobogin, Propor-
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Amendment cases turn on real property law, but only it is the primary 
source to which the Court has turned to inform reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy. 
As it turns out, intellectual property may be the far more relevant 
source of law to inform searches and seizures of intangible property.  
Just as state property law informs the reasonableness of searches of 
“houses,” intellectual property law provides important insights as to 
what constitutes unreasonable searches of “papers” and “effects.” 
1.  There’s a “Their” There 
The possessive “their” serves an important function in both the 
Fourth Amendment and Copyright Clause.  The Fourth Amendment 
guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects,”78 thereby securing personal rights to indi-
viduals.  The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution similarly ena-
bles Congress to secure “to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”79  Congress has used this 
power to create intellectual property rights.  A patent, for example, gives 
the patent holder a right to exclude others from making, selling, or us-
ing the patented invention.80  Copyright law also contains a right to ex-
 
tionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion:  A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 
1592 (2010).  This approach has great intuitive appeal, but it is difficult to see how 
courts could use it in practice to determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  See 
Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951, 958-59 (2009) 
(arguing that since “[t]he more intrusive something is, the more it alters the world that 
existed before,” people will sometimes fail to note that common police techniques, 
while not intrusive, threaten civil liberties).  And while it may seem appealing to reach 
a democratic consensus on constitutional reasonableness, this approach is in tension 
with the countermajoritarian motif of the Bill of Rights.  Professor Kerr, the leading 
scholar on cyber law and the Fourth Amendment, presciently focused on searches of 
electronic evidence and paved the way for current doctrine.  From his extensive work 
in this area, he has concluded that no single model of Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness can accurately describe current doctrine and proposes four different models in-
stead.  See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
506 (2007) (advancing a “probabilistic model,” a “private facts model,” a “positive law 
model,” and a “policy model” to describe the Supreme Court’s varying approaches to 
the Fourth Amendment). 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
79 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
80 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant . . . of the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the inven-
tion . . . .”); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) 
(“[E]xclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as 
it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.” 
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clude,81 which permits the copyright holder to simply deny others ac-
cess to or the use of the copyrighted material.82  In trade secret law, the 
right to exclude is crucial to the status of the information being pro-
tected as a secret.83  That right makes it unlawful for others to uncover 
the secret in certain impermissible ways.84  Even trademark law con-
tains a limited right to exclude others85 from appropriation and misuse 
of a trademark in the marketplace.86 
The possessive “their” in the Fourth Amendment extends to each 
person a privacy interest in her own person, house, papers, and effects.  
 
(emphasis added)); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“The enforceability of restrictions on the use of patented goods derives from the patent 
grant, which is in classical terms of property:  the right to exclude.”). 
81 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“[A] copy-
right holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’” (quoting 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))). 
82 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“A copyright owner’s right to exclude others from using his property is fundamental 
and beyond dispute.   As counsel for Amazon argued:  ‘[T]he law of the United States 
is a copyright owner may sit back, do nothing and enjoy his property rights untram-
meled by others exploiting his works without permission.’” (alteration in original) (ci-
tation omitted) (citing Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127)). 
83 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (“With respect 
to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the 
property interest.  Once the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, 
or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his prop-
erty interest in the data.”). 
84 But once a secret is uncovered, trade secret law provides less protection.  See 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (“[T]rade secret law does 
not forbid the discovery of a trade secret by fair and honest means.”); Bridgestone Ams. 
Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 192 n.3 (Ind. 2007) (“One of the biggest 
distinctions between a trade secret and ordinary property is the lack of a right to ex-
clude others from a trade secret’s use.  Thus, trade secrets may be thought of as a 
weaker form of property.”). 
85 See, e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Redican, 403 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 (D. 
Conn. 2005) (“The owner of a trademark may enforce the right to exclude others from 
using the trademark in an action for trademark infringement.”); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Lloyd Design Corp, 184 F. Supp. 2d 665, 673 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“To say one has a 
‘trademark’ implies ownership and ownership implies the right to exclude others.  If 
the law will not protect one’s claim of right to exclude others from using an alleged 
trademark, then he does not own a ‘trademark,’ for that which all are free to use can-
not be a trademark.” (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th ed. 2000))). 
86 See, e.g., La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 
1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) (“[T]he right to exclusive use of a trademark 
derives from its appropriation and subsequent use in the marketplace.  The user who 
first appropriates the mark obtains an enforceable right to exclude others from using it, 
as long as the initial appropriation and use are accompanied by an intention to continue 
exploiting the mark commercially . . . .”). 
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“Their” is generally defined as meaning “[o]f, belonging, or pertain-
ing to them.”87  Whether something is “theirs” depends on real and 
intellectual property law, which defines ownership of one’s own self, 
houses, papers or effects.  One’s interests may be violated whether a 
search occurs in one’s own home or that of another, but an individual 
will only be heard to complain when her own privacy interests have 
been violated.  As Justice Scalia has explained, the Fourth Amendment 
ensures that “each person has the right to be secure against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures in his own person, house, papers and effects.”88   
2.  They’re Authors 
The Fourth Amendment has always protected the security of one’s 
private papers.89  Yet courts and scholars have overlooked the fact that 
papers include the protected writings authored by individuals and not 
just the papers in their keep.  “Writings,” as the Supreme Court has 
said in the copyright context, include “all forms of writing, printing, 
engravings, etchings, [etc.], by which the ideas in the mind of the 
author are given visible expression.” 90   Such “writings” can be 
thought of as a special and distinct subset of Fourth Amendment 
“papers.”  From Lord Camden in Entick91 to modern courts92 and 
 
87 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 888 (2d ed. 1989). 
88 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Scalia dis-
cussed the founding-era materials confirming this interpretation of “their” as the under-
stood meaning at the time.  Id.  He looked to similar provisions existing in state 
constitutions before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and found that four had 
language similar to the Fourth Amendment, while two others avoided any ambiguity by 
“using the singular instead of the plural.”  Id. 
89 See Andrew Riggs Dunlap, Note, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade Secret Law:  
A Response to Kyllo v. United States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2191 (2002) (“The Framers 
were . . . concerned with the security of private information.  Accordingly, they included a 
citizen’s ‘papers’ among those items protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (foot-
note omitted)). 
90 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
91 See Entick v. Harrington, (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.) 1066 (Eng.) (describ-
ing private papers as “the owner’s . . . dearest property” and recognizing “more consid-
erable damages” for a trespass due to “the secret nature” of papers).  
92 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 580 n.7 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Private papers have been said to be little more than an extension of [the owner’s] per-
son, their seizure a particularly abrasive infringement of privacy, and their protection 
impelled by the moral and symbolic need to recognize and defend the private aspect of 
personality.” (alteration in original) (quoting James A. McKenna, The Constitutional 
Protection of Private Papers:  The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 
68-69 (1977)) (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
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scholars,93 there is near unanimity that the Fourth Amendment safe-
guards papers not as “mere parchment[s],” but as “the words, figures, 
and images the citizen chose to record—his private information.”94  
The Supreme Court has defined “authors” as those “to whom any-
thing owes its origin; originator; maker.”95  An author is one who cre-
ates some original expression96 and fixes that expression in a medium 
that is capable of being “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated.”97  Originality, including some “modicum of creativity,” is the 
“touchstone” of copyright protection.98  But the barrier to becoming a 
copyright author entitled to exclusive rights is quite low, and an au-
thor need not even intend to create an expressive work.  Mere fortuity 
“caused by a hand jolted by ‘a clap of thunder’” will suffice.99  
Although writings are a subset of papers safeguarded by the Fourth 
Amendment, different possessory interests attach to writings than to 
mere parchments.  Intellectual property law addresses this difference.  
Intellectual property law governs the exclusive rights in the substance 
of writings—the authors’ expression—while property law governs the 
exclusive rights in mere parchment. 
Just as the Fourth Amendment can protect an author’s papers, so 
too can it safeguard her intangible “effects.”  Intangible effects can be 
very important, as Shakespeare’s Claudius observed in Hamlet:  “Of 
those effects for which I did the murder?  My crown, mine own ambi-
 
93 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 310-18 (1981) (arguing 
that the Fourth Amendment is best understood as protecting secrecy and that the 
Framers were concerned with the confidentiality of private communications). 
94 Dunlap, supra note 89, at 2191. 
95 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (quoting JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 99 (Boston, Hickling, Swan & Brewer 1860)). 
96 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (defining 
“originality” in copyright to mean a work was “independently created by the author,” 
rather than copied, and contains some “minimal degree of creativity”). 
97 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “fixed”).  Neither fixation nor originality, how-
ever, is a significant barrier to copyright.  “Fixation can be as simple as jotting one’s 
thoughts on a notepad, hitting the ‘record’ button on an electronic device, or pressing 
a camera’s shutter button.”  Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life:  Some Thoughts on 
Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 834 (2009).  And 
originality requires only a minimal degree of creativity and admits of a wide range of 
work, from commercial advertisements to photography.  Id. 
98 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-47. 
99 Heymann, supra note 97, at 835 (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 
Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951)). 
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tion, and my queen.”100  Despite the Court’s proclamation in Olmstead 
that the Fourth Amendment only protects tangible effects,101 it has 
since recognized otherwise and extended Fourth Amendment safe-
guards to telephone conversations.102  In the modern age, such intan-
gible effects are often at least as important as tangible ones.  Consider 
the electronic documents stored on a cloud server or in text messages 
and emails.  Authorship and ownership exists in these effects just as 
much as in tangible printed papers.  From when Shakespeare penned 
Hamlet in 1599 to the modern day, one’s possessory effects have in-
cluded intangible thoughts, ambitions, and expressions.  Whether per-
sonal or impersonal, worn or carried about, or spoken aloud or 
written down, these intangible effects are secured by copyright and the 
Fourth Amendment.103  I argue that even if thoughts are kept sacro-
sanct in the brain, they are intangible effects secured to individuals by 
the Fourth Amendments. 
B.  The Right Legal Referent for the Right to Exclude 
Searches and seizures of mere parchments implicate a different pri-
vacy interest than searches of writings and intangible effects.  Authors 
have a special privacy interest—a secrecy interest—in their own written 
expressions beyond their possessory interest in other papers, which a 
seclusion interest protects.  Scott Turow, for example, may have the 
exact same seclusion interest in his dog-eared copy of a Michael Crich-
ton paperback as he does in the physical pages of his own unpublished 
manuscript.  But, in addition, he also has a qualitatively different secrecy 
interest in the content of his own manuscript, which he does not have 
 
100 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 3, ll. 54-55 (c. 
1599), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 1006, 1031 (W.J. Craig 
ed., 1919). 
101 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 13-16. 
102 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 20-28. 
103 See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion) (not-
ing that the Fourth Amendment protects property at all levels of personal importance 
to its owner, from diaries to dishpans), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798 (1982).  Note though that the Fourth Amendment safeguards only one’s 
lawful effects.  See Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 803 (7th Cir. 1920) (“It has 
never been deemed unreasonable to hunt for and take stolen property, smuggled 
goods, implements of crime, and the like.”). 
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in his copy of Crichton’s book.104  Privacy as seclusion may indirectly 
protect secrecy, but an independent secrecy interest also exists.  A 
secrecy interest limits access to or use of information, while a seclusion 
interest is concerned with having something left alone.105  Because the 
paradigmatic governmental search involves trespass upon real property, 
reasonableness inquiries have until now focused primarily on physical 
intrusions into one’s seclusion.  And yet, at least two distinct privacy 
interests arise in Fourth Amendment cases—seclusion and secrecy.  
Although courts rarely make clear which of these privacy interests a case 
may implicate, the distinction between seclusion and secrecy can ex-
plain and justify the outcomes in a wide variety of cases.106 
1.  Property and the Intrusion upon Seclusion 
Intrusion upon seclusion animates much of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine because lawful possession has traditionally been the founda-
tion for analyzing expectations of privacy.107  The interest in seclusion 
is the interest in restricting access to one’s person or effects by with-
drawing from society.108  The seclusion interest includes the right to 
work in private, stay at home, store information out of sight, and con-
ceal possessions so that they are beyond the detection of other people.109  
When roommates complain about a lack of privacy, they are speaking 
 
104 For an example showing the enforcement of a form of this secrecy interest, see 
infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text. 
105 See POSNER, supra note 93, at 268-76 (distinguishing privacy as seclusion from 
privacy as secrecy); Posner, supra note 46, at 173-76 (same). 
106 In some bodily intrusion cases, courts have recognized separate interests both in 
physical intrusion upon bodily seclusion and in informational privacy in aspects of 
one’s body.  For example, in People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992), the court dis-
cussed the distinct individual interests that arise with warrantless and suspicionless HIV 
testing:  “First, the drawing of the blood sample is itself an intrusion on the individual’s 
bodily integrity.  Second, the performance of the test on the sample also implicates 
fourth amendment interests.”  Id. at 579. 
107 But see William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1016, 1021-22 (1995) (arguing that “privacy-as-secrecy dominates the case law” and 
pointing to the “plain view” and seizure doctrines as examples of the trend). 
108 Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1979); 
see also id. (“An equivalent term is ‘retirement’ in its complex modern sense in which 
we speak of a person being ‘retiring’ and also of a person being ‘retired.’”). 
109 See POSNER, supra note 93, at 272-73 (listing a variety of situations that infringe 
on the seclusion interest in compromising one’s “peace and quiet”). 
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of privacy as seclusion.110  Brandeis and Warren describe this type of 
privacy in The Right to Privacy.111  The distinctive feature of the seclu-
sion interest is that it does not depend on the type of information se-
cluded or on its authorship. 
In Kyllo, the Court found that using thermal imaging to detect 
heat emanating from a private home was a Fourth Amendment search 
because it intruded upon the occupants’ seclusion in their home.112  By 
treating physical privacy as paramount, the Court assigned equal value 
to every detail inside the home.113  Justice Scalia opined, “The Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to meas-
urement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”114  Instead, 
every physical intrusion upon seclusion in the home, “by even a frac-
tion of an inch,” is a Fourth Amendment search.115  In the home, “all 
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from 
prying government eyes.”116 
One could read this case to protect secrecy, since the Court was 
concerned that the search could reveal intimate personal information.  
And yet, while the protection of intimate details is often at the heart of 
Fourth Amendment privacy inquiries, courts often measure the intru-
sion upon such confidential details by the degree of the physical intru-
sion upon the space where the information was secluded.  In other 
words, the method of measuring intrusion does not align with the 
purported emphasis on secrecy.  A better way to describe the case law 
is as a misalignment between the interests sought to be protected—the 
information—and the use of physical intrusion to measure that inva-
sion upon those interests.117 
Likewise, in bodily intrusion cases, including forcible stomach 
pumping,118 collection of hair,119 blood,120 urine,121 tissue,122 and breath 
 
110 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 108, at 3-4 (noting that this notion of privacy can be 
traced back to the seventeenth century as “withdrawal from the cares of public life 
through physical removal to a secluded garden or country estate”). 
111 Id. at 5 & n.14; see also supra note 17. 
112 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
113 Id. at 37. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
116 Id. 
117 The approach of emphasizing physical intrusion over seclusion also explains the 
distinction between “plain view” and “open air” Fourth Amendment cases. 
118 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952) (holding that pump-
ing a nonconsenting suspect’s stomach violated his due process rights, just as if officials 
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samples,123 courts and scholars focus on the physical indignity to the 
body as the measure of intrusiveness of the search.124  But they do not 
generally focus on the secrecy of the content of the information sought. 
Nevertheless, since Katz Fourth Amendment law has also addressed 
the concealment of information.125  Yet even in Katz, the Court ulti-
mately focused on Katz’s seclusion of himself in the phone booth and 
not on his interest in the substantive secrecy of his conversation.126  
Katz had secluded himself from the prying ears of others but not from 
their prying eyes, hiding his voice but not his physical presence.127  By 
 
had forced him to give a coerced confession); cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 
(1985) (ruling that officials cannot force a criminal suspect to undergo surgery with 
general anesthesia to remove a bullet that could provide evidence of guilt because such 
a procedure was too intrusive). 
119 See, e.g., United States v. D’Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 332-33 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curi-
am) (finding that cutting the defendant’s hair did not implicate his Fourth Amend-
ment privacy interests).  
120 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (ruling that 
mandatory blood tests for railway employees are Fourth Amendment searches because, 
“[i]n light of our society’s concern for the security of one’s person, it is obvious that [a] 
physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” (citations omitted)). 
121 See, e.g., id. at 617 (noting that urine tests are also Fourth Amendment searches be-
cause “society has long recognized as reasonable” an expectation of privacy related to urine). 
122 See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (holding that taking scrap-
ings from under fingernails was a Fourth Amendment search because it went beyond 
mere “physical characteristics . . . constantly exposed to the public” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 40 U.S. 1, 14 (1973))). 
123 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625-26 (holding that breath tests are less physically 
intrusive than blood tests and “reveal the level of alcohol in the employee’s blood-
stream and nothing more . . . . [B]reath tests reveal no other facts in which the em-
ployee has a substantial privacy interest.”).  Although the Court did not elaborate on 
what else a blood test might show that would implicate a different privacy interest, it 
seemed to imply that there may be at least some secrecy interest, in addition to a seclu-
sion interest, in the content of one’s blood. 
124 See, e.g., David C. Sarnacki, Comment, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily Intru-
sions, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 130, 142-43 (1984) (arguing that in bodily intrusion cases, the 
“[d]egree of intrusiveness should be evaluated in terms of the nature of the test, the 
manner in which it is performed, and the availability of less intrusive alternatives” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
125 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Arnold, Digital Media, and the Resurrection of Boyd, 81 S. 
CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 8, 12-13 (2008), http://weblaw.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ 
lawreview/documents/Hoffstadt_Brian_81_PS8.pdf (noting that Katz and its successors 
did not put much emphasis on the volume or nature of the information in question). 
126 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
127 See id. (“[W]hat [Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not 
the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”). 
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listening to his conversation, the police intruded upon the very seclu-
sion that Katz had sought.128 
In these concealed information cases, the Court has turned to real 
property law to evaluate the alleged expectation of privacy of the per-
son searched.  The right to exclude others is the strongest when offi-
cials search the home or body and weaker when the government 
searches property voluntarily and ordinarily exposed to the public.129  
An interest in excluding the government from tracking one’s automo-
bile, for example, is weaker than an interest in keeping the government 
out of one’s own home.  This distinction arises because one drives an 
automobile on public roads, thereby voluntarily exposing its movements 
to public view. 
Importantly, the reasonableness of an intrusion upon seclusion 
depends on the physical intrusiveness of the search, not the content or 
authorship of the information sought or revealed.  The more physically 
intrusive the search is, the greater justification the government will 
need to render it reasonable.  But whether a search reveals a soccer 
ball or a sex tape, the seclusion interest invaded is one and the same.  
The place upon which law enforcement intruded and the manner and 
means used to accomplish the intrusion determine the reasonableness 
of the search. 
2.  Copyright and Privacy 
We are accustomed to thinking of intellectual property law as a 
mechanism for securing the economic interests of authors and inven-
tors.  But just as real property law’s right to exclude has an important 
Fourth Amendment privacy implication, the right to exclude in copy-
right law has also historically included a crucial privacy dimension.  
Property rights alone do not define Fourth Amendment privacy inter-
ests.  A Fourth Amendment interest does not mean that property law 
recognizes privacy rights for lawful possessors of property, but rather 
that the Fourth Amendment confers a privacy interest based on a right 
to exclude others from the area being searched.  Lawful possession is 
 
128 Id. 
129 See Kerr, supra note 66, at 815-27 (arguing that after Katz, the Court continued to 
adhere to its earlier Fourth Amendment approach and still views potential Fourth Amend-
ment violations through the lens of real property law more than a “new” privacy law). 
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therefore neither the starting nor the ending point of a Fourth 
Amendment inquiry.130  
Copyright law accords authors a privacy interest in both the secrecy 
and seclusion of their writings.  A mere possessor of intellectual prop-
erty authored or owned by another has only one of these interests.  
Her rightful interest is in the seclusion—but not in the secrecy—of 
that expression.  The Fourth Amendment safeguards the privacy of 
authors in their papers and their effects.  It confers a privacy interest 
based on the possessor’s right to exclude—a right copyright law rec-
ognizes for authors in their expressions.  
The most basic principles of copyright predate the Copyright Clause 
and the Fourth Amendment.  At common law, authors enjoyed a broad 
and exclusive interest in their own expressions.  Common law copyright 
entitled authors to a broad right of nondisclosure of unpublished writ-
ing in order to keep their expressive effects concealed.131  
Scholars have painstakingly detailed the individual interests pro-
tected by common law copyright.132  Using the example of a private 
letter as a guide, Judge Jon Newman persuasively illustrated how the 
exclusive right of authors at common law protected the privacy of the 
sender and how copyright extended to all writers of letters whether 
those letters contained literary merit or not.133  An author’s right to 
exclude applied even if her writings were of the greatest public interest 
and importance.  When Alan Cranston copied nearly verbatim an ear-
lier and unabridged version of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf and dissemi-
nated it through Noram Publishing Company,134 the Southern District 
of New York issued a temporary injunction to enjoin the infringing 
publishing company from selling the book, notwithstanding the fact 
that an “average person interested in world events, interested in Hitler 
to the extent of wondering what kind of a man he might be, interested 
 
130 See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980) (finding that property 
rights are not dispositive, but rather only a factor in determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment provides protection). 
131 See Jon O. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA 
J.L. & ARTS 459, 462-63 (1988) (“[C]ommon law copyright . . . , as developed in the 
courts of England, provided protection more enduring and more extensive than pro-
tection available for published writings.” (footnote omitted)). 
132 See, e.g., id. 
133 Id. at 464. 
134 Anthony O. Miller, Court Halted Dime Edition of ‘Mein Kampf’:  Cranston Tells How 
Hitler Sued Him and Won, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, at 4, available at 1988 WLNR 
1807433. 
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in reading about current events in which Hitler has been taking an 
active part,” would want to read the infringing copy.135 
Warren and Brandeis located their right to privacy in the com-
mon law copyright privilege of authors to exclude others from their 
unpublished writings.136  Common law copyright gave authors an inter-
est in their “private writings, not just to secure the opportunity for au-
thors to enjoy their right of first publication—that is, the right to reap 
the economic benefit of their efforts—but also to provide protection 
for those who preferred not to publish at all.”137  Copyright protected 
the “production of the mind” as “property in every essential sense.”138 
The Copyright Act of 1976 preempted common law copyright with 
respect to “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by” 
the statute.139  However, the statutory regime retained the common law 
protection of the right not to publish—the secrecy right of authors—
irrespective of the economic value.  The right of first publication in 
modern copyright law includes within it the right to keep information 
secret or not to publish at all.140  The fact that an author is known to be 
using copyright to keep works unpublished, rather than publish them, 
does not undermine whether he is entitled to exclusive rights under 
copyright.141  And while some have objected that the right not to pub-
 
135 Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ’g Co., 28 F. Supp. 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
136 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
137 Newman, supra note 131, at 466. 
138 Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 485 (1867); see also Robert C. Post, 
Rereading Warren and Brandeis:  Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 647, 654 (1991) (discussing common law copyright and citing Grigsby as represent-
ing copyright’s core principle that production of the mind is property). 
139 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
140 See Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 145 F. 358, 362 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1906) 
(recognizing “the right to secrecy which the owner of a secret process or an inventor or 
author who has not obtained a patent or copyright has before publication”), rev’d on 
other grounds, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). 
141 See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[F]ederal copyright is now available for unpublished works that the author intends 
never to see the light of day.”); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 
1987) (holding that the potential harm to the value of plaintiff’s works “is not lessened 
by the fact that their author has disavowed any intention to publish them during his 
lifetime. . . . He is entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his letters . . . .”); Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107, 1996 WL 633131, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) 
(finding that fair use does not expand when the copyright owner has no intention of 
publishing the piece). 
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lish is contrary to the aims of copyright, this objection has not generally 
won doctrinal acceptance.142  
J.D. Salinger made the most famous use of the privacy dimension 
of copyright law.  When Ian Hamilton undertook to write Salinger’s 
biography, Salinger refused to cooperate and informed Hamilton that 
he preferred that a biography not be written about him during his life-
time.143  Hamilton proceeded anyway and dedicated three years to draft-
ing a biography that he entitled J.D. Salinger:  A Writing Life.144 
Hamilton drew extensively from several of Salinger’s unpublished 
letters written between 1939 and 1961 that had been donated by the 
recipients or their representatives to university libraries.145  Most were 
written to Whit Burnett, Salinger’s friend and an editor at Story maga-
zine, but other recipients included Judge Learned Hand and Ernest 
Hemingway.146  After Salinger objected to a draft that contained sub-
stantial direct quotations, Hamilton paraphrased large portions of 
many of these unpublished letters.147  Salinger sued, arguing that Ham-
ilton’s use of his unpublished letters constituted copyright infringe-
ment.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, finding 
Hamilton’s work to be close enough to the original letters, consti-
tuting infringement.148  Hamilton unsuccessfully argued that the 
paraphrases and excerpts were fair use.149  The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that a biographer like Hamilton could report the facts 
contained within the letters, but Salinger nevertheless had the right to 
protect the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the term 
 
142 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 605 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for permitting Harper and 
Row to “monopolize information,” and alleging that the majority jeopardized the “ro-
bust debate of public issues that is the ‘essence of self-government’” (quoting Garrison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964))); see also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Property’s 
Portrait of a Lady, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1037, 1113 (2001) (“[An author]’s right not to 
publish arguably frustrates the primary purpose of the copyright laws—making creative 
works available to society—by delaying publication of such a work at least until after the 
author’s death, and perhaps 70 years longer if the heir does not want to publish the 
work.  Nevertheless, it would be hard to argue that the copyright laws should be 
changed to make authors bring their works to market against their will.”). 
143 Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 92-93. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 98. 
149 Id. at 94, 99. 
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of his copyright.150  Unpublished works, the court explained, “normally 
enjoy complete protection against copying any protected expression.”151  
Similarly, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the 
unpublished memoirs of President Gerald Ford were intercepted and 
partially excerpted in an unauthorized publication.152  The Court sig-
naled that an author’s right of first publication will prevail against a 
claim of fair use, particularly where unpublished and undisclosed writ-
ings are concerned.153  The same holds true when balancing Fourth 
Amendment societal interests against individual ones.  Just as a claim-
ant will not prevail on a fair use claim when she infringes the secrecy 
of an author’s undisclosed writings, so too will only the most compel-
ling of government interests justify intrusion upon secretly authored 
and secretly memorialized papers or effects. 
Of course, the scope of Fourth Amendment protection of intellec-
tual property is not entirely dependent on states’ or Congress’s policy 
choices in copyright.  Just as states cannot abrogate the Takings Clause 
by a clever redefinition of “property,”154 states and Congress cannot 
sport away Fourth Amendment protections for intellectual property by 
gerrymandering copyright law.  Instead, a Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest for authors in their unpublished expressions aligns with the 
English common law approach of giving authors “nearly complete pro-
tection to [their] unpublished private writing, including its factual 
content.”155  Common law copyright included within it a much stronger 
dimension of privacy than modern copyright law, and that approach 
may better track societal expectations of privacy in individuals’ writings 
and effects.  Common law copyright closely corresponds to societal 
intuitions about secrecy of information, and this historical protection 
would better untangle expectations of privacy in informational effects. 
In short, just as real property law generally informs Fourth Amend-
ment interests when tangible property is intruded upon by a search, by 
 
150 Id. at 100. 
151 Id. at 97. 
152 471 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1985). 
153 Id. at 554-55.  But cf. Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326-27 (2d Cir. 
1978) (reversing a ruling that the plaintiffs’ common law copyright in their private letters 
was infringed by the CIA when it opened and copied the contents of those letters and 
finding that the CIA’s actions did not interfere with a right of first publication).  
154 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
155 Newman, supra note 131, at 477. 
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analogy, intellectual property law provides an important metaphor for 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of intellectual property. 
3.  Intrusion upon Secrecy 
A Fourth Amendment privacy interest arising from copyright in-
terests differs from a privacy arising from real property law.  The pri-
vacy interest in one’s home, for example, is a seclusion interest that 
does not turn on what is being secluded.  By contrast, copyright enti-
tles authors to keep confidential the substantive content of their ex-
pressions.  Secrecy can be preserved, at least in part, by seclusion or 
through nondisclosure of intimate, personal, or potentially embarrass-
ing information.156  But the Salinger case shows that even if the infor-
mation is not secluded, a form of secrecy is still preserved.  Although 
the recipients donated the parchment of Salinger’s letters to libraries, 
Salinger’s decision not to publish the letters strengthened his right to 
exclude Hamilton from broadly publishing the expressive content.157  
In the Fourth Amendment context, a government search or seizure 
of undisclosed writings and intangible effects—or of writings and 
effects shared only with an intended recipient—violates an author’s 
expectation of privacy in her protected expressions. 
Secrecy is a far more important privacy interest than seclusion in 
the information age.  In modern searches, investigators need not 
break down doors, rummage through drawers, or invade one’s peace 
and repose by even one fraction of an inch to obtain incriminating 
evidence.158  Instead, the government can unobtrusively intercept in-
formation as it travels in electrical frequencies, electrical wires, radio 
frequency signals (e.g., Bluetooth or WiFi), or via the GSM family of 
protocols that communicate between cell phones and towers.  The 
government can intercept unsecured information directly, and it can 
intercept secured information either from third-party service providers 
 
156 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1105 (2002) 
(“One of the most common understandings of privacy is that is constitutes the secrecy 
of certain matters.”); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake:  Toward an 
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 662 
(1985) (broadening the traditional conceptualization of privacy to include the control 
of information).  
157 See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (finding that the unpublished 
nature of the letters weakened Hamilton’s fair use defense). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding that using  a 
beeper device to track a shipment to a person’s home was not a search because it merely 
enabled what the naked eye could have seen). 
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or from the ultimate recipients.159  And in the not-too-distant future, 
the government might have the ability to imperceptibly and noninva-
sively obtain information directly from a suspect’s brain.160  
Justice Douglas recognized that Fourth Amendment privacy con-
cerns include a secrecy interest—or the right of nondisclosure of 
one’s secrets. 
The personal effects and possessions of the individual . . . are sacro-
sanct . . . . Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to 
reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. . . . Those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual needs both to 
communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself.  That dual 
aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to 
select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his se-
crets with others and decide the extent of that sharing.
161
 
And in at least a few cases, the Court has intuited the intellectual 
property dimension of the Fourth Amendment without saying so ex-
plicitly.162  In Walter v. United States, for example, the Court addressed 
the warrantless search of the content of films that were obtained with-
out any intrusion upon the owner’s property.163  Walter, the film owner, 
had shipped them across state lines in a secure package that was mis-
takenly delivered to a third party.164  The third party opened the box 
and found individual film boxes that had suggestive drawings and ex-
plicit descriptions of the films.  He then tendered the unwatched boxes 
of film to the FBI.  Now in lawful possession of the boxes, the FBI 
agents watched the films to obtain evidence of their obscene content 
for use against the film owners in a criminal case.165  A plurality of the 
Court found that, although the FBI had not intruded upon Walter’s 
real property interests in the films, the agents nevertheless ran afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment by conducting the warrantless search of the 
 
159 See id. at 282 (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement 
as science and technology afforded them in this case.”). 
160 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 379-89 (summarizing recent research that suggests 
that police “may soon be able to retrieve memories stored within the brain”). 
161 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
162 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“We must examine the 
nature of the particular documents sought to be protected in order to determine 
whether there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”). 
163 447 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
164 Id. at 651-52. 
165 Id. at 652. 
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films’ contents.166  The agents had not violated Walter’s property or 
seclusion interest, but the warrantless search unreasonably intruded 
upon his  privacy interest in secrecy.167 
The plurality found that, despite the physical unobtrusiveness of 
the search, there remained an “unfrustrated portion” of Walter’s pri-
vacy interests subject to Fourth Amendment protection.168  Walter had 
an interest in the secrecy of the video’s contents, which he retained 
even after he sent them to a third-party recipient169 and would have 
retained even if he had privately screened the films.170  That interest is 
akin to the interests one retains in both the seclusion and secrecy of 
memorialized letters sent by postal mail or electronic messaging.171  
Walter’s Fourth Amendment interest, like Salinger’s copyright inter-
est,172 is like the distinctive interest of a copyright owner in the con-
tent of her work. 
The best reading of Walter is that the Court recognized that indi-
viduals sometimes retain an interest in the secrecy of the substantive 
contents of their information.  Particularly for expressive materials 
such as books, films, or private writings, that interest may be informed, 
at least in part, by intellectual property law.  Yet the Court should have 
determined whether Walter was the copyright owner of the films seized.  
If so, then the secrecy interest the Court recognized would have 
aligned with a source of law that supports a right to exclude others 
from the substantive content of the films. 
The Court has not always protected the substantive content of writ-
ings, and the doctrinal results can seem inconsistent.  In United States v. 
Miller, the government had intercepted evidence against a suspect by 
directing his bank to make copies of all of his available checks and de-
posit slips.173  The Court held that no Fourth Amendment interest had 
been frustrated by the government’s investigational technique.174  The 
checks were “not confidential communications but negotiable instru-
 
166 Id. at 659. 
167 Id. at 658-59. 
168 Id. at 659. 
169 Id. at 658-59. 
170 Id. at 662 (White, J., concurring). 
171 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (recognizing “the secrecy of letters” 
and holding that the Fourth Amendment protects the contents of sealed packages but 
not the “outward form and weight”). 
172 See supra notes 143-51, 157 and accompanying text. 
173 425 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1976). 
174 Id. at 440. 
Farahany FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 1:03 PM 
2012] Searching Secrets  1273 
ments to be used in commercial transactions.”175  The intellectual 
property metaphor here is instructive.  The doctrine of joint author-
ship grants both authors full copyright interests in the work.176  The 
banking papers the government searched at least in some sense were 
coauthored by both Miller and his bank.177  While Miller may have 
conveyed the information to the bank to keep confidential, the inter-
ception did not intrude upon any privacy-as-secrecy interest Walter 
may have had.178  
Although the result in Miller may seem inconsistent with Walter, 
when the cases are reexamined through the lens of intellectual prop-
erty, they can be more easily reconciled.  If Walter held a copyright in 
the films, then even when his shipment went astray he retained a se-
crecy interest.  That interest must be weighed against societal ones to 
gauge the reasonableness of the warrantless search.  This interpreta-
tion of Walter would be in accord with Salinger.  Salinger retained an 
exclusive right to first publication of his letters, even after he mailed 
them to recipients.179  By contrast, Miller’s authorship in his checks and 
deposit slips would not be protected as a joint author of the same.180   
Notice how the analysis in these two cases is simplified by an intel-
lectual property law metaphor.  The interest recognized in each case is 
analogous to the respective interests of the claimants as defined by intel-
lectual property law.  For both Walter and Miller, the Court implicitly 
addressed their respective interests in just this way.  But had the Court 
explicitly invoked intellectual property law, the consistent link between 
the two cases would have been revealed. 
 
175 Id. at 442. 
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006); see also id. § 101 (defining “joint work”). 
177 425 U.S. at 442.  
178 Id. at 440. 
179 See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1987) (making 
the distinction between ownership of the physical letter and ownership of the copyright 
in the letter’s content); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
180 Even assuming the minimal standard for originality were met, see supra notes 96-
99 and accompanying text, the information on the checks and deposit slips would not 
be protectable due to either its factual nature or the merger doctrine.  See, e.g., Morris-
sey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (declining to recog-
nize a copyright when there are only a limited number of ways to express an idea). 
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III.  THE SECRETS PROTECTED 
Acknowledging the existence of a Fourth Amendment seclusion 
interest for all and an additional secrecy interest for authors explains 
many existing riddles in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  In addi-
tion to papers and effects, this Part discusses both traditional and fu-
turistic sense-enhanced searches along a spectrum of evidence and 
authorship.  It demonstrates confusion in existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine concerning the individual interests at stake and describes 
how the addition of intellectual property rights to inform the Fourth 
Amendment protection of individual interests better explains existing 
doctrine.  Because the Fifth Amendment does not stand in isolation 
from the Fourth Amendment, and more often, these two protections 
run hand in hand,181 the taxonomy in Incriminating Thoughts182 also ap-
plies in the search and seizure context. 
The taxonomy includes four categories of evidence:  identifying, 
automatic, memorialized, and utterances.183  Those four categories 
comprise a spectrum:  from the first category to the last, an individual 
exerts increasingly more control over the creation of evidence.184  The 
spectrum can also present a view of copyright, with stronger claims in 
the rightward categories.  Thus, an individual has the strongest claim 
of authorship in uttered and memorialized evidence and the weakest 
claim of authorship in automatic or identifying evidence.  Because 
memorialized and potentially recorded utterances are the proper sub-
ject of copyright protection, a court must balance the intrusion upon 
both the seclusion and the secrecy of the individual against the gov-
ernmental interest in the evidence sought to decide if an unreasona-
ble search or seizure has occurred  
While descriptively robust, the normative shortcomings of the real 
property/intellectual property framework will be compounded by 
emerging technology.  To illustrate those shortcomings, this Part also 
explores how the Fourth Amendment would apply in the following 
 
181 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (observing that “the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other” when someone’s testimony or pri-
vate papers are used against her). 
182 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 353-55 (introducing a new taxonomy to describe 
categories of evidence in lieu of the physical/testimonial dichotomy underpinning the 
privilege against self-incrimination); see also id. at 406 (leaving unanswered how the 
search and seizure of that same evidence would fare). 
183 Id. at 355. 
184 Id. 
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hypothetical—but not far-fetched185—investigation using brain search-
es.  Suppose a police officer has stopped a motorist he believes to be 
intoxicated.  Should the motorist remain silent, the policeman could 
nevertheless use neuroscience to glean information from the motorist 
during a brief and physically unobtrusive stop.  Using a mobile bio-
metric brain scanner, the officer would gain precise and reliable in-
formation about the motorist’s identity.  Scientists hypothesize that 
each person’s brain has a unique neural fingerprint that would enable 
precise biometric identification by “reading” the electrical impulses 
emitted by the firing of neurons in the brain.186  The officer could also 
bypass the need to have the motorist perform a breathalyzer test to 
assess her intoxication by directly measuring her brain’s metabolism of 
glucose.187  And rather than asking the motorist whether she had been 
drinking, the police could probe her brain for episodic memories of 
her evening.  Scientists have made substantial headway in detecting 
memories stored in the brain and have already demonstrated detec-
tion of past faces, voices, or sounds and differentiated among specific 
episodic memories that a subject recalls.188 
More directly, the police would be able to seek contemporaneous 
utterances by the motorist and use either on-the-spot brain-based lie 
detection techniques or more sophisticated techniques that seek to 
“decode” her contemporaneous, conscious, and unspoken thoughts.189  
Some of these warrantless probes of the brain are more reasonable 
than others, and we can tell the difference between them by determin-
ing when one has a secrecy interest in the contents of one’s brain and 
when one has only a right to seclude oneself from others. 
With respect to these more futuristic sense-enhanced searches, 
scholars have made sweeping claims that an individual has a “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the details of what is in her head, even 
though the government doesn’t have to invade the body to learn the 
information.”190  Others have disagreed, finding that because neuro-
imaging is noninvasive, such investigations are not unreasonable 
searches.  The latter group believes that because a suspect can be 
 
185 See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. 
186 Farahany, supra note 8, at 380. 
187 See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
188 Farahany, supra note 8, at 379-84. 
189 Id. at 394-95. 
190 Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 325 (2006). 
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compelled to take similarly noninvasive blood and urine tests, “[t]here 
is no reason to think that similar circumstances would not likewise sat-
isfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement for neuro-
logical tests.” 191   Both extremes ignore the subtle and nuanced 
challenges that cognitive neuroscience raises for Fourth Amendment 
law.  What is in one’s head is far more diverse than mental states or 
thoughts and also includes identifying and automatic processes.192  
Emerging neuroscience could enable the detection of simple static 
images that reveal present brain trauma, visceral reactions and behav-
ioral disposition, simple and complex memories, and the present 
thoughts and visual imagery in the brain.193  The intellectual property 
interests of individuals help better explain how such searches would 
fare in a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Although this Part illustrates how intellectual property law gives de-
scriptive grounding to the secrecy interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, it also reveals another secret lurking just beneath current 
doctrine.  Automatically generated evidence is an entire category of 
evidence that has become increasingly more detailed and available in 
the information age.  Under existing doctrine, individuals enjoy no 
secrecy interest in this category of information.  And because most of 
this information is in some sense voluntarily conveyed to third parties, 
the so-called “third-party” doctrine means that individuals here lack a 
seclusion interest as well.194  A Fourth Amendment privacy interest tied 
only to real property and intellectual property law may fail to protect the 
kinds of information that society may reasonably expect to keep private. 
 
191 Dov Fox, Brain Imaging and the Bill of Rights:  Memory Detection Technologies and 
American Criminal Justice, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34, 35 (2008).  Other scholars who have 
considered bodily intrusions and the Fourth Amendment have likewise ignored sub-
stantive secrecy concerns and focused instead on the physical intrusiveness of the test.  
See, e.g., Sarnacki, supra note 124, at 142-47 (“Degree of bodily intrusion should be 
evaluated in terms of the nature of the test, the manner in which it is performed, and 
the availability of less intrusive alternatives.” (footnotes omitted)). 
192 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 380. 
193 See id. at 368-69, 375, 377-78, 380-84, 396-97. 
194 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(noting that the doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks”).  
Farahany FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 1:03 PM 
2012] Searching Secrets  1277 
A.  Identifying 
Save for the hermit or recluse living her whole life in seclusion, an 
individual has no cognizable secrecy interest in identifying evidence.  
Identifying evidence includes information about an individual’s charac-
teristics and her physical likeness as well as static and descriptive infor-
mation about the individual or about individuals with whom she 
associates.195  It also includes a person’s name, birth date, weight, 
height, clothing size, shoe size, blood type, and traces of shed DNA.196  
Such information may help connect a suspect with the known attrib-
utes of a criminal perpetrator,197 but no legal basis currently exists for a 
Fourth Amendment secrecy interest in such evidence.   
Intellectual property law sheds new light on why current doctrine 
does not afford individuals a secrecy interest in identifying evidence.  
Under intellectual property law, individuals are denied a secrecy inter-
est not because they have abandoned that information, but because 
they neither authored nor originated it.  Further, individuals have only 
a minimal interest in secluding identifying information because they 
regularly reveal their identifying characteristics to the world.  Thus, 
without a claim of protected authorship, only their real property–
based seclusion interest persists. 
This framework, which recognizes seclusion and secrecy interests, 
describes current Fourth Amendment doctrine on identifying infor-
mation better than existing frameworks do.  Beginning with Terry v. 
Ohio,198 the Court has held that upon probable cause it is reasonable 
for a police officer to require an individual to disclose her identity dur-
ing a brief investigative stop.199  Until Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court 
of Nevada,200 however, the Court had left open whether a suspect could 
be “arrested and prosecuted for refus[ing]” to disclose her identity 
during a stop based on reasonable suspicion.201  The Hiibel Court re-
 
195 Farahany, supra note 8, at 368. 
196 Id. 
197 Id.  
198 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
199 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
questioning factory workers did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search and sei-
zure and stating that “police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth 
Amendment violation” (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), and Brown v. Tex-
as, 443 U.S. 47 (1979))); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that a police officer stopping 
and frisking a person based on the officer’s suspicion does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
200 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
201 Id. at 186-87 (citation omitted). 
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solved this question by holding that states may require a suspect to dis-
close her name during an investigative stop because the individual pri-
vacy interest in identity is negligible compared to the legitimate 
government interests promoted by the inquiry.202  Intellectual property 
provides the missing legal grounding for the analysis.  Hiibel did not 
author his name, so he lacked a legally cognizable interest under the 
Fourth Amendment in maintaining the secrecy of his identity. 
Each time the Court has been presented with a case involving 
identifying information, it has assumed, but not explained, that indi-
viduals lack a secrecy interest in their identifying attributes.203  The 
Court has held that compelling a suspect to provide physically identify-
ing information—such as fingerprints204 or voice exemplars205—is usu-
ally reasonable because such techniques intrude upon no cognizable 
individual interest.  In a case deciding whether a grand jury subpoena 
requiring about twenty people to give voice exemplars for identifica-
tion, the Court held that neither the seizure (which required that the 
person appear) nor the search (which used the search exemplar for 
identification) were unreasonable.206  Although the Court could have 
focused on an individual interest in seclusion, it surmised that physical 
features, including vocal characteristics, are so frequently exposed to 
public view that no meaningful intrusion upon seclusion had oc-
 
202 See id. at 188 (noting that the “stop and identify” statute at issue in the case 
served the useful purpose of increasing the likelihood that a suspect would actually 
disclose his identity to a police officer). 
203 For example, the Court in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), noted that 
the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what “a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office . . . .”  The physical char-
acteristics of a person’s voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content 
of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. . . . No person 
can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his 
voice . . . . 
Id. at 14 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
204 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Detention for fingerprinting 
may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of 
police searches and detentions.  Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an 
individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.”). 
205 See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14 (“No person can have a reasonable expectation that 
others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect 
that his face will be a mystery to the world.”). 
206 Id. at 13-18. 
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curred.207  Courts have held similarly in other identification and loca-
tion-determination cases, including the use of beepers to pinpoint lo-
cation208 and biometric information for identification.209  In short, each 
of these cases focuses on a seclusion interest, but not a secrecy interest, 
in identifying information. 
Lower courts grappling with the new territory of electronic searches 
of informational property have also held that individuals lack a secrecy 
interest in their identifying information.  Courts have rejected Fourth 
Amendment interests in identifying information such as the to/from 
address fields in emails and other addressing and routing infor-
mation.210  In treating email address fields as identical to address infor-
mation on postal envelopes, courts have extended protection to the 
content of emails, like letters, but not to the identities of the senders 
and the recipients.211  These cases build upon the foundation of Smith v. 
Maryland, in which the Court held that the government’s use of a pen 
register was not a Fourth Amendment search.212  Framed in terms of 
seclusion, the Court found that when numbers are conveyed to a third 
party to connect a call, the caller fails to seclude the numbers dialed.213  
 
207 See id. at 14 (describing the reasonable expectation that others will be familiar 
with one’s physical features). 
208 See Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve Been?:  Privacy Concerns Regard-
ing the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 314-15 
(2004) (describing United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), which held that 
pinpointing one’s location or movement through one’s beeper is not subject to a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy). 
209 See Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Tech-
nology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 654, 668-69 (2003) (discussing the impli-
cations for individuals’ privacy concerns of biometric data collection, “the science of 
identifying people based on their physiological and behavioral characteristics”). 
210 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of 
text messages), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 
(2010); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that In-
ternet users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in email addresses or their 
history of visited websites); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (assert-
ing that “it is too much to believe” that telephone users have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the numbers they dial, even if dialed inside the home).  
211 See United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Alt-
hough a person has a legitimate interest that a mailed package will not be opened 
and searched en route, there can be no reasonable expectation that postal service 
employees will not handle the package or that they will not view its exterior . . . .” 
(citations omitted)).  
212 442 U.S. at 742. 
213 Id. at 744. 
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Using the content/no-content dichotomy as its guide, the Court held 
that since pen registers do not acquire the contents of the phone call, 
they are distinguishable from listening devices like those in Katz.214  
Only the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber and automatically 
generated information that they provide to ISPs, but this decision was 
based on the expansive protections of personal information guarded 
by the New Jersey Constitution, not by the U.S. Constitution.215 
Although courts have applied a content/no-content distinction to 
reach this result, an intellectual property metaphor provides a better 
guide.  Consider bodily intrusion cases.  Should we view the body as a 
container, and blood and cells as the content inside?  If so, the con-
tent/no-content distinction would predict that a blood sample is pro-
tected while the external surfaces of the body are not.  This outcome 
makes little sense and does not align with current doctrine.216  An intel-
lectual property framework, by contrast, does not depend on whether 
evidence is visible to the naked eye.  Instead, because individuals have 
not authored the information, they lack a cognizable secrecy claim in 
their blood.  The only relevant interest arises from seclusion, and so 
the method by which the government obtains the sample will thereby 
determine the reasonableness of its seizure. 
Intellectual property law also recognizes that expression but not 
facts are subject to copyright protection because “facts do not owe 
their origin to an act of authorship.”217  Rather, “[t]he first person to 
find and report a particular fact has . . . merely discovered its exist-
ence.”218  As identifying information is a set of facts, a suspect can 
rarely, if ever, claim that such information contains original expressive 
content.  Consequently, individuals have only a privacy interest in the 
 
214 Id. at 741. 
215 See State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 28 (N.J. 2008) (“We . . . hold that citizens have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, protected by . . . the New Jersey Constitution, in the 
subscriber information they provide to Internet service providers . . . .”). 
216 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (finding that the 
forced extraction of blood samples from a defendant after his arrest for driving under 
the influence was a reasonable method of measuring his blood alcohol level). 
217 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
218 Id.; see also id. at 361 (noting that even if the compiler of a phonebook had 
“been the first to discover and report the names, towns, and telephone numbers of its 
subscribers,” the information does not satisfy the originality requirement because it 
“existed before [the compiler] reported [it] and would have continued to exist if [the 
compiler] had never published a telephone directory”). 
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seclusion of identifying information, but not in its secrecy.  Thus, when 
seclusion has been abandoned, no viable privacy interest remains. 
The intellectual property framework also guides how sense-
enhanced brain-based searches of identifying information would fare 
in a way that the content/no-content dichotomy cannot.  In the hypo-
thetical motorist stop introduced above, the police know the identity 
of a sought-after terrorist, but not that of the motorist.219  Should the 
motorist refuse to provide her identity, the police might nevertheless 
employ biometric technology to quickly and unobtrusively identify her.  
Biometric identification is an automated process that uses an individu-
al’s physical characteristics to identify her.220  Biometric technology has 
already developed for facial recognition, fingerprinting, and iris 
scans.221  Emerging techniques in neuroscience now enable identifica-
tion of an individual based on her brainwave patterns.222  There is 
some evidence that brainwave signals for each individual are unique—
even between two people thinking about the same thing—and cannot 
be falsified.223  Technology has already been developed that can record 
electroencephalographic (EEG) signals using a noninvasive helmet.224  
Police may one day be able to use this technology for on-the-spot iden-
 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 185-89. 
220 See SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PRIVACY & BIO-
METRICS:  BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 4 (2006), available at http://www. 
biometrics.gov/docs/privacy.pdf (defining biometrics as “automated methods of recog-
nizing an individual based on measurable biological . . . and behavioral characteristics”). 
221 See id. at 15-17 (describing existing technologies for such biometric methods). 
222 See Gelareh Mohammadi et al., Person Identification By Using AR Model for EEG 
Signals, 11 WORLD ACAD. OF SCI. ENGINEERING & TECH. 461, 463 (2005) (explaining 
that because brain waves “carr[y] genetic information,” they can be used to determine 
a person’s identity); Fingerprints and Faces Can Be Faked, but Not Brain Patterns, SCI. DAILY 
(Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/02/090205101138.htm 
(describing emerging brain scan technology that, in the future, may be used to identify 
individuals); Will Knight, Brain Activity Provides Novel Biometric Key, NEW SCIENTIST ( Jan. 
16, 2007), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn10963-brain-activity-provides-novel-
biometric-key.html (summarizing the technology behind brain scans); A. Riera et al., 
Unobtrusive Biometric System Based on Electroencephalogram Analysis, EURASIP J. ON AD-
VANCES IN SIGNAL PROCESSING 6-7 (2008), http://asp.eurasipjournals.com/content/ 
2008/1/143728 (showing that electroencephalogram recordings of the brain may be 
valuable for identification). 
223 C. Eswari & S.K. Ramya, Biometrics Using Headgear to Scan Brainwaves, 2011 PROC. 
NAT’L CONF. ON INNOVATIONS IN EMERGING TECH. 95, 95. 
224 Id. at 96.  
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tification by comparing a suspect’s brainwave pattern with those in a 
database of brainwave patterns.225 
That the police might use such technology to identify individuals is 
neither far off nor far-fetched.  Already police forces across the coun-
try are rolling out a new investigative device that attaches to the back 
of an iPhone and enables police to do on-the-spot fingerprint scanning, 
facial recognition, and iris scanning.226  This biometric technology 
merely adds to the vast array of identifying information that investiga-
tors can unobtrusively obtain, including static brain images, blood 
samples, and shed samples of DNA.227   
Because an individual cannot claim authorship over her biometric 
data, seclusion is the only recognized privacy interest that these 
searches could implicate.  When seclusion is the sole cognizable inter-
est at stake, the physical intrusiveness of the search governs its reason-
ableness.228  Taking a few hair clippings from a suspect in custody, for 
example, intrudes only minimally upon her seclusion.229  But forcing a 
suspect to undergo surgery, by contrast, is unreasonable because it 
imposes significant potential physical harm on the individual.230 
And yet, an individual does not bare her biometric brain activity to 
the world in the same way that she reveals her more visible identifying 
characteristics, so she cannot as easily be viewed as having abandoned 
an interest in secluding that information.  But as other bodily intru-
sion cases have made plain, if the techniques involved subject the indi-
 
225 This hypothetical assumes that the biometric read-out provides no information 
other than the suspect’s identity, or something as simple as “this person matches the 
suspect sought” or “this person does not match the suspect sought.”  If the device did 
more, such as reveal the suspect’s substantive thoughts, additional Fourth Amendment 
interests would be implicated.  Cf., e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) 
(holding that canine searches are not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because they are “limited both in the manner in which the information is 
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure”). 
226 Emily Steel, How a New Police Tool for Face Recognition Works, WALL ST. J. DIGITS 
BLOG ( July 13, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/how-a-new-
police-tool-for-face-recognition-works.  
227 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 368-70. 
228 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
permits “reasonable inquiries” to determine a suspect’s identity). 
229 See, e.g., United States v. D’Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding 
that taking a clipping of hair from a suspect in custody without a warrant is minimally 
intrusive and therefore is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 
230 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755-56 (1985) (holding that the surgical removal 
of a bullet from the suspect’s body was unreasonable given the procedure’s risks and 
the availability of other evidence of guilt). 
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vidual to minimal or no physical intrusion, the societal interest in the 
information sought may justify the warrantless use of biometric brain 
scanning.  Individuals will thus have a cognizable seclusion—but not a 
secrecy—interest in their biometric brain evidence, just like their other 
identifying information.  
B.  Automatic 
Likely the most important and also most underanalyzed question 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is:  What individual interests are 
protected when the police collect automatically generated evidence 
about an individual?  Automatic evidence encompasses those actions 
and reactions that occur with little or no conscious control by the indi-
vidual.231  To date, scholars have lumped such automatic evidence with 
no-content information.  As the hypothetical automated phone system 
example described above illustrates,232 content/no-content does not 
accurately predict whether automatic information falls into one cate-
gory or the other.  This is particularly problematic in the information 
age because much of the information that investigators now seek to dis-
cover arises in the form of automated evidence.  The information in 
email headers, an Internet browser’s log of IP addresses, and the GPS 
triangulation of a person’s movements all occur automatically as a by-
product of an individual’s voluntary activities. 
In the electronic domain, user activity generates information auto-
matically.  Examples include Internet searches and communications, 
routing information attached to emails as they travel from one ISP to 
another, and automated information exchanged between one’s com-
puter and ISP, all of which produce substantial automatic logs.  The 
portability of GPS technology and its integration into mobile devices 
and automobiles enables the triangulation and tracking of a person’s 
location by querying her cell phone provider or mobile traffic pro-
vider.  All of these processes occur automatically, without the con-
scious control, active manipulation, or even awareness of the user 
being tracked. 
When it comes to automatically generated information, there is 
currently no coherent Fourth Amendment approach to disentangling 
the individual privacy interests at stake.  In bodily intrusion cases con-
cerning automatic bodily functions, for example, the Supreme Court 
 
231 Farahany, supra note 8, at 372-73. 
232 See supra Section I.B. 
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has sometimes balanced individual interests in seclusion or secrecy 
against the legitimate advancement of societal needs.233  Intrusion upon 
seclusion of the body occurs when testing penetrates “beneath the 
skin,” and the “ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain phys-
iological data” intrudes upon substantive secrecy.234  The beneath-the-
skin analogy seems like the “content” part of the dichotomy.  And yet 
breath-testing procedures, which generally require the suspect to ex-
pel a deep breath for chemical analysis, have also aroused the Court’s 
intuition that the seclusion of the body has been infringed.235  These 
interests are certainly not absolute ones, as the Court has found such 
procedures to be reasonable searches so long as the test is routine and 
minimally physically invasive. 
Challenges to the constitutionality of automatic location-tracking 
devices have had similarly mixed results, though a more consistent fo-
cus on seclusion is beginning to emerge, particularly after Jones.  In 
United States v. Knotts, for example, law enforcement officers installed a 
tracking beeper inside a container of chloroform with the manufac-
turer’s consent and then used that beeper to track the movements of 
one of the defendants as he transported the container from one loca-
tion to the next.236  Because the warrantless beeper tracked the move-
ment of the defendant’s vehicle only through public streets, the Court 
found that no unreasonable search had occurred.237  The defendant 
had abandoned his interest in secluding himself and the container by 
transporting it through public streets that any onlooker could observe.  
The police could simply have followed him, and that would not have 
been a search.  In contrast, the Court in United States v. Karo held that 
the warrantless use of a tracking beeper was an unreasonable search 
because it had tracked Karo not only on public throughways but also 
while inside his own home.238  Unlike driving on a public street, when 
 
233 Compare Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that compelling the 
surgical extraction of a bullet from an arrestee was unreasonable), with Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72 (1966) (holding that compelling an individual arrested 
for drunk driving to take a blood test was reasonable).  
234 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1985); see also id. at 617 
(“[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts 
about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”).  
235 See id. at 618 (“Any limitation on an employee’s freedom of movement that is 
necessary to obtain . . . breath samples . . . must be considered in assessing the intru-
siveness of the searches effected by the Government[] . . . .”). 
236 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).  
237 See id. at 285. 
238 See 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
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Karo returned home, he had not abandoned his interest in seclusion.  
Thus, the warrantless tracking implicated a protected Fourth Amend-
ment interest. 
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court resolved conflicting 
perspectives among lower courts239 on whether attaching a GPS track-
ing device to an automobile and tracking its movements constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search.240  The D.C. Circuit found that the twenty-
four-hour surveillance of Jones’s movements using a GPS device at-
tached to his car was unreasonable.241  In doing so, the D.C. Circuit 
focused on the intrusion upon the defendant’s seclusion in his com-
ings and goings, finding that he could not have expected to be tracked 
twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days straight.242  The differ-
ence between occasional observation and constant and complete sur-
veillance transformed what would otherwise have been a nominal 
intrusion to a complete one by revealing an “intimate picture of the 
subject’s life that he expects no one to have.”243  The court found that 
the warrantless monitoring constituted a search,244 and under the total-
ity of the circumstances, was an unreasonable one.245  
The Supreme Court, by contrast, focused only on whether a 
Fourth Amendment search had occurred.  The government’s theory 
was that no individual interest had been intruded upon by tracking 
Jones’s movement through public throughways.  The government had 
forfeited arguing that if a search occurred, the search was a reasonable 
one, so the Court did not resolve that question.  Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence intimates that had the Court reached that question, she 
 
239 See generally Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant:  Fourth Amendment Con-
cerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1072-79 (2010) (discussing the split in judicial authority on the 
constitutionality of warrantless tracking using GPS devices and cellular telephones). 
240 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits had held that such 
actions do not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  See United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, No. 10-7515, 2012 WL 538278 
(U.S. 2012); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-998 (7th Cir. 2007).  The D.C. 
Circuit disagreed, holding that use of a GPS device is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub 
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
241 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 568. 
242 See id. at 563. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 563-64. 
245 Id. at 566-67. 
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would have found that the search to have been unreasonable.  The 
majority opinion did not echo the same sentiment.  
Does the intellectual property metaphor predict the resolution of 
this claim?  By driving a car with a GPS device attached, Jones could 
not have claimed to have authored or originated expressive writings or 
intangible effects.  While Jones did originate the logged movements, 
those movements do not amount to expressive content subject to copy-
right protection.  Because Jones lacked a legally cognizable claim in 
the secrecy of his movements,246 only intrusion upon his seclusion was 
at stake.  And judicial review of such intrusions will focus on the physi-
cal invasiveness of the search,247 which in GPS-tracking cases are usually 
quite minimal.248  The private details of Jones’s life concern an interest 
in secrecy, yet that interest is not protected by intellectual property law. 
The concurring opinions in Jones emphasized that even more chal-
lenging cases stemming from the search of automatically generated 
information will arise.249  Call logs from cell phones generate auto-
matic tracking information, including information about the location, 
time of day, and duration of each call.  The interface between individ-
uals and the Internet will create even more constitutional conundrums.  
Every keystroke in a web browser sends detailed information to the 
host server apart from the expressive writings themselves, including 
the type of computer the user has as well as her operating system, web 
browser, and each IP address and URL she views.250  These automated 
logs create a transactional history of every keystroke, every website, and 
potentially every moment of one’s online daily life.  From research 
questions concerning personal health to queries seeking relationship 
advice, IP addresses provide a window into what is in one’s mind.  
 
246 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012). 
247 See id. at 949 (stressing that the concept of a Fourth Amendment “search” in-
cludes physical intrusions by the government). 
248 See id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that installation of a 
GPS device is “relatively minor” and “trivial”). 
249 See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“With increasing regularity, the Gov-
ernment will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by en-
listing factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.  
In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a 
physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little 
guidance.” (citation omitted)); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting 
that the “availability and use” of location-tracking technology “will continue to shape the 
average person’s expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements”). 
250 Junghoon Oh et al., Advanced Evidence Collection and Analysis of Web Browser Activity, 
8 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION S62, S64-S66 (2011). 
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Emails also create such a trail as each server an email encounters adds 
yet another line of information to the email’s header.  These email 
headers reveal much more than the mere identity of the user; they also 
reveal the approximate location of the sender and her institutional 
affiliations.  As courts grapple with the reasonableness of investigations 
seeking automatic evidence in the information age, the analogies to 
draw from are thin, and a rationale is needed to guide the courts as to 
whether an interest in seclusion, secrecy, or both apply. 
The intellectual property metaphor helps predict how the Court 
might address this central conundrum of past and emerging Fourth 
Amendment law.  An individual will rarely if ever have a legitimate 
claim to be a copyright author of automatically generated personal 
information.  And real property law does not grant a privacy-as-secrecy 
interest to that information.  What then, is her basis to exclude the 
government from the information?  If anything, it must rest in seclud-
ing the information.  But courts have posited that an individual aban-
dons her interest in secluding information by using technology that 
voluntarily conveys that information to third parties. 
More concerning still is that automatically generated information 
includes far more than just the digital traces left behind by using elec-
tronic devices.  Individuals generate considerable information through 
the automatic functioning of their own bodies.  Considering the intel-
lectual property interests of the hypothetical stopped motorist dis-
cussed above predicts how a claim about secrecy concerning 
automatically generated bodily functions of the motorist might fare.251  
The police could one day bypass the use of breathalyzer or blood-
alcohol tests by directly measuring the level of alcohol intoxication in 
the brain.  Using positron emission tomography (PET), a form of 
brain imaging that provides an index of brain functioning, researchers 
have shown that the brain exhibits decreased brain glucose metabo-
lism in patterns that roughly parallel the regional distribution of par-
ticular receptors for neurochemicals in the brain. 252   Newer 
neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI), can likewise detect both the level and nature of the im-
pairment an individual experiences when intoxicated by drugs or 
 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 185-89. 
252 See Gene-Jack Wang et al., Regional Brain Metabolism During Alcohol Intoxication, 24 
ALCOHOLISM:  CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 822, 825-27 (2000) (discussing the 
effects of acute alcohol consumption on blood glucose metabolism in the brain). 
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alcohol.253  By measuring changes in oxygenated and deoxygenated 
blood flow in the brain, scientists can measure the effects of intoxication 
on an alcohol- or drug-impaired motorist.254  Today, the wide-scale 
adoption of such techniques would be cost-prohibitive and cumber-
some, particularly since the required scanners are large and often 
immobile.  But if Moore’s law is any guide, one should expect both 
an exponential rate of improvement and an increased portability of 
neuroimaging devices in time.255 
The hypothetical motorist again may have a claim to seclusion of 
this information.  But she would lack any currently recognized cog-
nizable Fourth Amendment claim concerning the glucose-metabolism 
or other automatic functioning in her brain.  Like the search for 
brain-based biometric evidence discussed above, the intrusion upon 
her seclusion interest would be minimal at best because it would not 
be physically invasive and would therefore yield to a legitimate societal 
interest in the evidence sought.  In short, current doctrine predicts 
that seclusion is the only cognizable interest that an individual can 
claim in automatically generated information.  When it comes to 
searches of automatically generated information, the Fourth Amend-
ment will provide minimal if any protection. 
C.  Memorialized 
At the heart of many traditional and modern criminal investiga-
tions is the search for papers and effects that lead to the discovery of 
incriminating evidence.  Memorialized evidence includes recorded 
papers and effects such as written documents, depictions, photographs, 
stored electronic records, or even encoded memories in the brain.  
Thoughts are recorded in memorialized writings, calendar notations, 
emails, text messages, recorded dictation, replies to electronic invita-
tions, and more.  Together, these memories create the authored pa-
 
253 See, e.g., V.D. Calhoun et al., Using Virtual Reality to Study Alcohol Intoxication Effects 
on the Neural Correlates of Simulated Driving, 30 APPLIED PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY & BIO-
FEEDBACK 285, 286-88 (2005) (providing a brief synopsis of previous work using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging to study the neural correlates of alcohol intoxication). 
254 Id. at 286. 
255 See Ian H. Stevenson & Konrad P. Kording, How Advances in Neural Recording Af-
fect Data Analysis, 14 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 139, 141-42 (2011) (noting that the 
number of single neurons that physiologists may simultaneously record doubles 
about every seven years, just as Moore’s law predicts computer processing speed 
doubles every two years). 
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pers and effects to which a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in se-
crecy currently applies. 
Individuals memorialize everyday activities in both tangible and in-
tangible form.  Whether written in a personal diary or encoded in the 
substructures of the brain, memories reflect the traces of everyday lives.  
These memories include people met, the timbre of voices heard, foods 
eaten, smells and sounds experienced, visual imagery encountered, 
and ideas imagined.  
The information age puts new pressure on the interests implicated 
by an investigation for memorialized evidence.  In Fourth Amendment 
cases concerning private papers, business records, email messages, and 
smartphone documents, courts often focus on whether a physical tres-
pass occurred as the sole measure of the individual interest implicated 
by the search.  At times, however, courts have acknowledged that “a 
private writing is only the barest extension of a private thought”256 and 
have sometimes recognized an interest in its secrecy.  But even then, 
courts have failed to explain why some information merits secrecy and 
other information does not.  Until now, there has been no legal prin-
ciple or referent to explain that difference. 
It is well settled that individuals are protected against the unwar-
ranted opening of their sealed letters and packages.257  Lower courts 
have recognized a similar privacy interest in text messages vis-à-vis an 
individual and her service provider.258  In United States v. Finley, for ex-
ample, the Fifth Circuit held that when Finley used a cell phone given 
to him by his employer for his employment-related uses, he had a pos-
sessory interest in the phone and therefore a right to exclude others 
from reading his text messages and listening to his calls.259  When the 
 
256 Newman, supra note 131, at 471. 
257 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other 
sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy . . . .”); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“[A] 
distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter,—between what is 
intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages . . . [,] 
and what is open to inspection . . . .”). 
258 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[U]sers do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their text mes-
sages vis-a-vis the service provider.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text mes-
sages on his cell phone and that he consequently had standing to challenge the search). 
259 See 477 F.3d at 259 (“Finley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call 
records and text messages on the cell phone . . . .”). 
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Supreme Court recently addressed the reasonableness of a warrantless 
search of the text-message transcript log of a government-issued pager, 
the Court relied on a workplace exception to find the search constitu-
tionally permissible.260  The Court abstained from addressing the more 
far-reaching implications of interests in memorialized evidence and cau-
tioned lower courts to tread carefully when dealing with the issue.261 
Although courts have split over whether the privilege against self-
incrimination will sometimes shield the use of private papers against a 
defendant,262 with near uniformity they have held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not bar their ultimate discovery.  At first, it seemed 
as if the Supreme Court would extend full Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to private papers and books,263 but the Court has since concluded 
that the search for private papers implicates no greater interests than 
any other memorialized evidence.264 
The Court has implicitly relied on an intellectual property law 
metaphor to deny suspects a secrecy interest in the writings authored 
by others.  In Fisher v. United States, for example, the Court correctly 
intuited that authorship triggers a distinct Fourth Amendment interest 
without noticing the crucial linkage to copyright authorship, uphold-
ing a subpoena for papers prepared by a defendant’s accountant.265  
No unreasonable search of the defendant had occurred because the 
papers were the accountant’s, and the defendant was not their au-
thor.266  Had the defendant been the author and the search directed at 
 
260 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (“[W]hen conducted for a noninvestigatory, work-
related purpose or for the investigation of work-related misconduct, a government 
employer’s warrantless search is reasonable if it is justified at its inception and if the 
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not exces-
sively intrusive in light of the circumstances . . . .” (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 
U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
261 See id. at 2629 (“Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case 
are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of 
privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communica-
tion devices.”). 
262 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 384-88. 
263 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (“[W]e have been unable 
to perceive that the seizure of a man’s private books and papers to be used in evi-
dence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness 
against himself.”). 
264 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 474 (1976) (finding that there is no 
special interest justifying the protection of papers from search and seizure). 
265 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). 
266 See id. (finding that the Fifth Amendment “privilege protects a person only 
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications”). 
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tax records he himself had prepared, the Court implied that a privacy 
interest in secrecy might have applied.267 
In United States v. Miller, the Court also implicitly focused on au-
thorship in deciding whether secrecy applied, reasoning that “[o]n 
their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not respondent’s ‘pri-
vate papers’ . . . [but] pertain to transactions to which the bank was 
itself a party.’”268  Neither Miller nor the bank could claim sole author-
ship of the memorialized records that the government had subpoe-
naed.  As joint authors to the transactions, both parties had the right 
to disclose the transactional records to third parties.  The same ra-
tionale holds true when the government subpoenas papers from a 
corporation that a corporate officer authored on the corporation’s 
behalf.  In such a case, the corporation is the aggrieved author and 
only it can claim that its privacy interest has been intruded upon in 
challenging the reasonableness of a search. 269   Likewise, Fourth 
Amendment complainants generally fail when the government seizes 
books and papers that the defendant neither authored nor owned.270 
The Court’s failure to acknowledge explicitly authors’ intellectual 
property interest in Fourth Amendment cases explains its misguided 
 
267 See id. at 414 (“Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from 
producing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here, for the 
papers demanded here are not his ‘private papers.’”). 
268 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976) (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n 
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 48-49 (1974)). 
269 See Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 804 (7th Cir. 1920) (holding that the 
individual authors of business documents could not object to the seizure of business 
documents because the author was the corporation, not the individuals). 
270 See, e.g., Tsuie Shee v. Backus, 243 F. 551, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1917) (finding no vio-
lation of Fourth Amendment rights where the material seized was not owned by the 
defendant); Moy Wing Sun v. Prentis, 234 F. 24, 26 (7th Cir. 1916) (holding that peti-
tioner’s constitutional rights were not violated because the letters were not in his pos-
session and he denied any claim to them); United States v. Silverthorne, 265 F. 853, 857 
(W.D.N.Y. 1920) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects only individuals 
whose rights have been invaded by search or seizure).  The owner may, however, object 
to such seizure.  See Owens v. Way, 82 S.E. 132, 133 (Ga. 1914) (“The constitutional 
protection against unreasonable seizure of property would go for naught if it should be 
conceded that an arresting officer may arbitrarily possess himself of the property of a 
third person, solely upon the ground that it may be used as evidence against the de-
fendant in the warrant.”); Newberry v. Carpenter, 65 N.W. 530, 532 (Mich. 1895) (“No 
intimation is found in any statute of this state . . . that a prosecutor may cause to be 
seized the property of third parties, the possession, ownership, and use of which are not 
prohibited by law . . . and their private enclosures to be entered for that purpose.  Such 
seizures are unwarranted, unreasonable, and prohibited by the constitution of the 
United States and of this state.”). 
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reasoning in Andresen v. Maryland.  After obtaining a warrant, investi-
gators searched the defendant’s office and seized papers, including 
“memoranda written in petitioner’s handwriting.”271  These were de-
fendant’s private papers—not “corporate records”—generated by the 
defendant in the course of his personal legal business.272  The Court 
found that “[t]here is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished 
from other forms of property, to render them immune from search 
and seizure.”273  The Court altogether missed the important connec-
tion between copyright and the Fourth Amendment and thereby im-
properly focused only on the physical seclusion of Andresen’s papers 
during the investigation.  Finding the intrusion upon seclusion to have 
been minimal and also that “the petitioner was not treated discourte-
ously during the search,”274 the Court held that no unreasonable 
search and seizure had occurred.275  It may have held differently if it 
had factored Andresen’s secrecy interest in the papers that he au-
thored into the reasonableness of the search. 
Because the Court has overlooked the linkage between the secrecy 
interest and copyright authorship, lower courts have had virtually no 
guidance on how to weigh the individual interests at stake in govern-
ment searches of private papers.  Consequently, in cases like DiGuiseppe 
v. Ward, the Second Circuit found no privacy interest in the secrecy of 
a prisoner’s diary.276  After a sweep of a prison following a riot, a prison 
guard seized a prisoner’s diary and read its contents.277  The inmate 
made no claim that he intended to disseminate or publish the diary, so 
the court overlooked the copyright implications of the search and fo-
cused on First Amendment interests instead.278  Reading the diary, the 
court found, did not intrude upon his “right to speak, nor, of course, 
upon his right to listen, to believe, or to associate.”279  And likening 
reading the diary to the inevitable intrusion upon seclusion that the 
search of the prison necessitated after the riot, the court ultimately 
held that no unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of the in-
 
271 Id. at 466, 469. 
272 See id. at 468 n.2 (“It is established that the privilege against self-incrimination 
may not be invoked with respect to corporate records.”). 
273 Id. at 474 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921)). 
274 Id. at 477. 
275 Id. 
276 See 698 F.2d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 1983). 
277 Id. at 603-04. 
278 Id. at 605. 
279 Id. 
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mate’s papers had occurred.280  Like the Court in Andresen, the court 
missed a crucial dimension of the prisoner’s privacy interest at stake.  
Had the Second Circuit applied intellectual property as a relevant legal 
referent to the prisoner’s privacy interest in his expressive writings, it 
would have recognized that the prisoner had both seclusion and secrecy 
interests in his diary.  It would then have balanced the prisoner’s secre-
cy and seclusion interests against the government’s interest in the 
evidence sought and decided whether these intrusions rendered the 
search unreasonable. 
Intellectual property provides an important metaphor to guide 
courts in deciding the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in 
memorialized evidence.  Authors have a statutory right to exclude 
others from their unpublished works, including their diaries, emails, 
text messages, and private papers.  Of course, authors do not always 
keep their writings secret or secluded.  Indeed, copyright law contem-
plates that authors can and should be incentivized to share their writ-
ings with others.  When authors share with others, they may do so in a 
limited fashion—such as in the exchange of private letters or in the 
exchange of private communications with a priest or attorney.  They 
might instead share broadly, by publishing their writings for anyone 
and everyone to see.  Once they release their writings and effects to 
the world, their rights are similarly limited and circumscribed by copy-
right law.281  The question of how strongly a secrecy interest applies in 
each of these contexts is a fruitful area to explore in future research. 
When an author shares with others, she may demonstrate a will-
ingness to forego some of her privacy interests in the seclusion and 
secrecy of her expressions.  The more broadly she shares, the more 
telling her decision to forego the privacy interest she may have had.282  
Depending upon with whom and how the author shares, for example, 
the recipient may gain a possessory interest in the shared expression.  
That possessory interest grants the recipient the right to disclose what 
she has learned, although the right to publish—and the right to ex-
 
280 Id.  Nevertheless, the court took pains to mention that the prison guard seemed 
uninterested in the contents of the diary and used it primarily to find information con-
cerning the riots.  Id. 
281 See Heymann, supra note 97, at 838 (noting how in both copyright and privacy 
law, wide distribution of an author’s material leads to fewer rights for the author). 
282 See Newman, supra note 131, at 472 (“[T]he private writing of a private thought 
is entitled to protection in the name of privacy only so long as the writer maintains the 
writing within his or her grasp . . . .”). 
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clude others from publishing—remains with the author.283  This fea-
ture of intellectual property law could well provide important insights 
into Fourth Amendment cases, particularly when the government serves 
a subpoena on the recipient rather than the author of information.  
And yet the secrecy interest that authors have in memorialized 
information should hold irrespective of whether the information has 
been stored in tangible form, electronically on a computer or a cloud 
server, or in memories in their brains.  In the brain, memories are en-
coded by memory type, with each memory type mediated by different 
neural structures.284  Memories are quite personal to the experience of 
an individual.  Two individuals looking across a courtyard, for example, 
will focus on different aspects of the scene before them.  The memo-
ries they encode of that moment will be personally created expressions 
of their own experiences.  
It may already be possible to access memories in the brain, includ-
ing simple recognition memory, recall of past voices and faces, or even 
detailed episodic memories in the conscious mind.285  If the hypothet-
ical motorist had been drinking before driving, for example, her expe-
rience and the timing, location, and sensory associations of that 
evening will have been stored within her brain.  Episodic memory de-
scribes the class of neurological memories related to particular bio-
graphical episodes or life events.  These memories include the content 
of the experience and the spatial and temporal context in which it oc-
curred.286  Such memories are formed when the brain bonds individual 
events to the specific temporal context in which the event took 
 
283 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.04, at 
5-56.15 (2011) (“[T]he general rule is that the author of a letter retains the ownership 
of the copyright or literary property contained therein while the recipient of the letter 
acquires ownership of the tangible physical property of the letter itself.”); see also In re 
McCormick’s Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 413, 417 (1952) (holding that the children of a 
deceased serviceman had a possessory interest in the letters that he sent to them while 
at war); Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480, 486 (1867) (stating that the recip-
ient of a private letter holds the general property rights in the letter, qualified only by 
the author’s right to publish it or prevent its publication).  
284 Morris Moscovitch et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Remote Episodic, Semantic and 
Spatial Memory:  A Unified Account Based on Multiple Trace Theory, 207 J. ANATOMY 35, 38-
39 (2005). 
285 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 379. 
286 Donna Rose Addis et al., Age-Related Changes in the Episodic Simulation of Future 
Events, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 33, 33 (2008). 
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place.287  Through neuroimaging studies, it is now possible to detect 
and differentiate between specific memories in the brain,288 including 
both the “what” and the “when” of those memories.289  Using tech-
niques such as fMRI, one can predict an individual’s mental state by 
studying the patterns of blood-oxygen-level-dependent signals across 
her brain and decoding those patterns with multivariate pattern classi-
fication techniques.290  Although portable and robust memory detection 
may never materialize and on-the-spot memory detection may be the 
musings of science fiction, these advancements nevertheless present an 
opportunity both to ask and answer when an investigation for memorial-
ized evidence exceeds reasonable Fourth Amendment bounds. 
With intellectual property as a metaphor, one has a secrecy inter-
est in their brain-based memories if those memories contain expressive 
content.  And because the expressive content must be intruded upon 
to glean any facts contained therein, common law copyright would 
extend a secrecy interest irrespective of a copyright fact/expression 
dichotomy.  Indeed, the challenge for brain-based evidence may not 
be whether memories contain expressive content, but whether they 
are sufficiently “fixated” in the brain to warrant a copyright privilege to 
exclude others.  Fixation is the legal moment at which constitutional 
authorship begins.291  The Copyright Act of 1976 confers exclusive 
rights to copyright owners—the right to publish, to copy, and to distrib-
 
287 Yuji Naya & Wendy A. Suzuki, Integrating What and When Across the Primate Medial 
Temporal Lobe, 333 SCIENCE 773, 773 (2011). 
288 See, e.g., Martin J. Chadwick et al., Decoding Individual Episodic Memory Traces in the 
Human Hippocampus, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 544, 545 (2010) (“Now that we have shown 
that it is possible to directly access information about individual episodic memories in 
the human hippocampus in vivo and noninvasively, this offers new opportunities to 
examine important properties of episodic memory, to explore possible functional 
topographies, and to examine neural computations within hippocampal subfields.”); 
Jesse Rissman et al., Detecting Individual Memories Through the Neural Decoding of Memory 
States and Past Experiences, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9849, 9852-53 (2010) (“If one’s goal 
is to detect neural correlates of subjective remembering, the data provide novel evidence 
that, at least under the constrained experimental conditions assessed here, this could be 
achieved with high accuracy . . . .”). 
289 See Naya & Suzuki, supra note 287, at 774 (“[O]ur data show that PRC neurons in-
tegrate time and item information by modulating their stimulus-selective response 
properties across temporally distinct stimulus presentations.”). 
290 See, e.g., Chadwick et al., supra note 288, at 544; Rissman et al., supra note 288, at 9849. 
291 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
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ute writings—from the moment original expression has been fixed in a 
tangible medium.292  Fixation is the act of preserving something, even if 
only temporarily, in a tangible medium of expression.293  Whether that 
expression is a hasty text, a literary tome, or a memory recorded in the 
brain, once fixed, the expression is subject to federal copyright law.294 
The statutory language concerning fixation makes plain a “differ-
ence between the work entitled to copyright protection and the mate-
rial object in which the work is fixed.” 295  Although some legal rights 
now attach to the latter, the former is the focal point of copyright pro-
tection.  Fixation provides tangible evidence of the copyrightable ex-
pression, but it is the expression itself that is the subject of the 
copyright, and not the tangible good.  Once the expression is reduced 
to tangible form, property rights can then attach, enabling authors to 
realize the economic incentives at the heart of copyright.296  Where 
Fourth Amendment interests are concerned, however, the economic 
interests matter less than the privacy interests in first publication and 
the corollary right not to publish.  In that context, whether fixed in 
external tangible form or fixed as memory in the brain, a Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest should exist in both modes of expression. 
Cases concerning fixation in the information age are consistent 
with this approach.  Courts have readily accorded copyright protection 
to the “electronic bits and bytes” of a software program, even though 
some other equipment, like a computer, and some other programs, 
like operating systems, are required to make them run.297  Modern 
courts have embraced temporary fixation in software loaded into 
random-access memory (RAM) and video game displays that can be 
 
292 As noted in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, section 106 pro-
vides in pertinent part, 
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has 
the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following: 
 (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . ;  
 (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyright work; 
 (3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public . . . . 
471 U.S. 539, 546 n.1 (1985) (alterations in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)). 
293 Heymann, supra note 97, at 829. 
294 Id. at 855-56. 
295 Id. at 848-49. 
296 Id. at 849. 
297 Id. at 850. 
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perceived only when the game is played.298  In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit held that when a 
maintenance company loaded the software into RAM to “view the sys-
tem error log and diagnose the problem with the computer,” fixation 
was satisfied.299  Other courts addressing software and temporary elec-
tronic fixation have held similarly, drawing from the language of the 
Copyright Act that the form, manner, and medium of fixation are un-
important.300  These cases all suggest that even transient fixation is suf-
ficient to evoke exclusive rights for authors.  Whether flickering on a 
computer monitor or flickering in the brain, both can now be per-
ceived and thus should come within the ambit of exclusive rights ac-
corded to authors. 
In short, fixation addresses a technical rather than substantive 
concern about protecting authored expression.  That technical hurdle 
supposed it “impossible to ‘copy’ an ‘idea,’” when it existed solely as “a 
conception in someone’s mind.”301  But modern neuroimaging tech-
niques may now enable the detection and reproduction of what exists 
in the mind just as easily as one perceives the bits and bytes inside a 
computer program. 
 
298 Id.  
299 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Heymann, supra note 97, at 850-51. 
300 See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442-43 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that video games and other computer programs stored on a disk or a read-
only-memory device (ROM) are copyrightable).  In another example, Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-54 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit 
held that Apple’s proprietary operating system, fixed in a ROM chip, is protected by 
copyright.  The court rejected the arguments that a computer program is not protected 
when fixed in object code, that a computer program is not protected when fixed on a 
ROM chip rather than on a printout, and that an operating system program is not the 
proper subject of copyright.  Id.  Additionally, in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981), the court held that a computer program is 
a “work of authorship” subject to copyright, and a silicon chip upon which a program is 
imprinted is a “tangible medium of expression.”  The court based its decision in part 
on the legislative history of section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, which stated that “it 
makes no difference what the form, manner or medium of fixation may be—whether it 
is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, 
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, 
punched, magnetic, or other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception di-
rectly or by means of any machine or device ‘now known or later developed.’”  Id. 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976)).  But cf. Cartoon Network v. CSC Hold-
ings, 536 F.3d 121, 126-30 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that copies of a television program 
loaded into RAM for 1.2 seconds are held for only a “transitory duration” and thus are 
not fixed for purposes of the Copyright Act). 
301 Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int’l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 872 
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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When memorialized information is expressed on paper, a com-
puter, a cell phone, or in the brain, there is a legal basis in intellectual 
property for authors to have an expectation of a privacy interest in se-
crecy.  Consequently, whether unpublished and undisclosed, written 
or held in the mind, authors have a Fourth Amendment secrecy inter-
est in their memorialized writings and their effects. 
D.  Utterances 
Utterances are thoughts, visual images, words, or statements that 
are verbalized or recalled to the conscious mind, whether spoken 
aloud or ruminated on silently in the brain.  Although this category of 
evidence is the primary focus of Fifth Amendment protections,302  
Fourth Amendment interests are also implicated when investigators 
seek to discover a suspect’s verbal or silently pondered utterances. 
Evoked and voluntary utterances implicate different constitutional 
interests.  Evoked utterances arise by compelling a suspect to respond—
either silently or aloud—to questions or prompts.  Voluntary utterances 
are instead given freely and without government demand.  Whereas 
voluntary divulgences are beyond the scope of Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination because the utterances have not been 
compelled, only extraordinary societal justification or prosecutorial 
immunity will justify government compulsion of evoked utterances.303 
Evoked utterances also implicate Fourth Amendment interests in 
seclusion of one’s person, when a person is seized and forced to re-
spond to government interrogations.  Circumscribed by the Court’s 
ruling in Terry v. Ohio,304 the reasonableness of a warrantless stop and 
brief questioning by a government official based on reasonable suspi-
cion will depend on the length of the detention and methods used to 
elicit answers.305  In general, brief and minimally physically intrusive 
detentions do not raise Fourth Amendment concerns.306  Here again 
the Fifth, but not the Fourth Amendment, holds the relevant protec-
tive interest of being safeguarded by the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
 
302 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 389. 
303 For a detailed description and discussion of these categories, see id. at 389-400. 
304 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). 
305 See, e.g., United States v. Esquivias, 416 F.3d 696, 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (outlining 
the factors relevant to assessing the reasonableness of a Terry stop). 
306 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
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When defendants challenge voluntary utterances that investigators 
have intercepted, courts have focused almost exclusively on the seclu-
sion of those utterances.  Yet a suspect knowingly risks abandoning 
such seclusion when she speaks aloud.  In Silverman v. United States, for 
example, police officers described incriminating conversations they 
overheard by means of an electronic listening device.307  They installed 
a “spike mike” several inches into the party wall of the criminal sus-
pect’s house, thereby trespassing upon his home.308  The Court ig-
nored the “frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an 
electronic age may visit upon human society”309 and instead focused 
only on the method of intrusion, holding that the “eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration.”310  
The intrusion upon the seclusion of the home from prying ears was an 
unreasonable search.311 
When the Court in Katz v. United States moved beyond trespass to 
privacy,312 it similarly found that the interception of a telephone booth 
user’s conversation was unreasonable.313  In so holding, the Court rea-
soned that Katz had used the seclusion of the phone booth, and as 
such, he was “entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the 
mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to the world.”314 
And yet by uttering thoughts aloud to others, a conversant may as-
sume the risk that his words will be repeated, recorded, and used 
against him.  In United States v. White, a plurality of the Court held that 
a wired informant’s transmission of a conversation to government 
agents implicated no Fourth Amendment interests.315  It considered 
the individual interests at stake in intercepting voluntary utterances, 
and expressly declined to recognize a secrecy interest in such conver-
 
307 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 509. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
313 Id. at 359. 
314 Id. at 352. 
315 See 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“It would be a dubious service 
to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment to make them bedfellows 
with spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which would liken eaves-
dropping on a conversation, with the connivance of one of the parties, to an unreason-
able search or seizure.” (quoting On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S 747, 754 (1952))). 
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sations.316  The Court held similarly in United States v. Caceres, where a 
majority repudiated the idea that any privacy exists in the voluntary 
utterances made to others, including government agents.317  State and 
federal courts have used the same reasoning to find that eavesdrop-
ping or recording of conversations by a willing informant or under-
cover agent implicates no individual Fourth Amendment interests.318  
Courts have consequently approved the use of informant statements 
based on notes of conversations,319 secret radio transmissions of conver-
sations,320 and the use of tape recorders321 to share conversations with 
the government.  These cases suggest that, where utterances are con-
cerned, the only expectations of privacy that will be found reasonable 
are ones based in seclusion. 
Intellectual property law provides new insight for why individuals 
have until now been denied a Fourth Amendment secrecy interest in 
their utterances.  In general, one cannot claim copyright protection 
for an entirely unfixed conversation,322 speech, or even performance 
 
316 Id. at 752-53. 
317 440 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1979). 
318 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 362 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It is firmly 
established that audio recordings, obtained without a warrant and through hidden 
recording devices by an invited guest, do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”); Ho-
back v. State, 689 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ark. 1985) (“The rule that an accused relies on a 
colleague at his own risk is well established.  We have relied upon decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in holding that recordings made with the consent of an 
informant are admissible.”); State v. Grullon, 562 A.2d 481, 488 (Conn. 1989) (“Just as 
an undercover police agent, without having first obtained a warrant, may take notes 
reciting a conversation with a defendant, so the agent may simultaneously record the 
conversation or transmit it to recording equipment.”); Snellgrove v. State, 569 N.E.2d 
337, 339 (Ind. 1991) (adopting the view that “the Fourth Amendment provides no 
protection to the wrongdoer who mistakenly believes that a person to whom he vol-
untarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it” (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 (1966))). 
319 See, e.g., United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629, 631 (3d Cir. 1975) (rejecting a se-
crecy interest in a voluntary conversation because the “possibility of repetition is a well-
known risk that the prudent man weighs before disclosing confidential information”). 
320 See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 751; Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1952); 
United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ryan, 
548 F.2d 782, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d 314, 318 (6th 
Cir. 1974); Ansley v. Stynchcombe, 480 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1973). 
321 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1963) (finding that when 
an individual converses with a government informant who records the conversation, he 
has voluntarily disclosed the contents of his mind, and thus there is no intrusion into a 
secluded area not accessible by the human eye or human ear). 
322 See, e.g., Taggart v. WMAQ Channel 5 Chi., No. 00-4205, 2000 WL 1923322, at *4 
(S.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s copy-
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under the Copyright Act, with an exception for musical concerts.323  
For a speech or conversation to be sufficiently fixed to warrant copy-
right protection, it must be fixed with the consent of the performer.324  
Beyond that, the extent and the medium of fixation necessary to satisfy 
the statutory requirements of copyright are subjects of considerable 
debate.  Courts have grappled with and rejected copyright protection 
for utterances such as words spoken on the telephone,325 a spoken lec-
ture,326 a conversation between two individuals,327 a live, unrecorded 
 
right claim to a news interview because the mere spoken words in an interview were not 
enough to generate a proprietary interest). 
323 See 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 4:7, at 4-15 (2006) (stating 
that live broadcasts and performances are unequivocally ineligible for copyright protec-
tion because they are “transient works,” and that copyright protection only extends to a 
“prior or simultaneous recording of the performance”); 3 THOMAS D. SELZ ET. AL., 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW:  LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 16:3, at 16-16 
(3d ed. 2011) (“Unfixed works, such as unrecorded extemporaneous speeches and 
improvisational jazz solos, are not protected by federal copyright law, but may be pro-
tected by state law.”); David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 
(1995) (“One basic bedrock provision in the interpretation of [the Copyright and Patent 
Clause] has been that its reference to ‘Writings’ denotes fixation . . . . But no respectable 
interpretation of the word ‘Writings’ embraces an untaped performance of someone 
singing at Carnegie Hall.”); see also 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON 
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 1:42.70, at 1-196.18 to .19 (3d ed. 2010) 
(“As part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act . . . that brought the United States into 
the World Trade Organization . . . , Congress enacted [the first federal] civil and criminal 
statutes to protect against the unauthorized recording of live musical performances, and 
the unauthorized sale and distribution of [such] recordings . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  
324 See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650 n.5 (Ct. App. 1996) (“A work is 
fixed in a tangible [form] of expression for purposes of the Act, only if recorded ‘by or 
under the authority of the author.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994))). 
325 See Phillips v. Inc. Magazine, No. 86-5514, 1987 WL 8047, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 
1987) (upholding the idea that words spoken over a telephone are not fixed and there-
fore are not copyrightable unless recorded); see also Feldman v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 357, 364 (D. Mass. 2010) (“[C]opyright protection is only 
available for ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.’  
Plaintiff’s private telephone conversations, which are not ‘fixed,’ therefore, are not 
copyrightable.” (citations omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006))). 
326 See Fritz v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 95, 99-100 (D. Mass. 1996) (hold-
ing that a lecture extemporaneously created is not protected by copyright, although the 
same lecture fixed on paper would be protected). 
327 “[A] conversation between two individuals, however profound, is not fixed in a 
tangible medium and would therefore be ineligible for [federal] copyright protection.  
The audio recording of that same conversation is considered a fixed sound recording, 
and could therefore be protected.”  David A. Costa, Vernor v. Autodesk:  An Erosion of 
First Sale Rights, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 213, 214 (2011), http://lawrecord.com/files/ 
38_Rutgers_L_Rec_213.pdf (footnote omitted). 
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movie pitch,328 and choreography that has never been filmed or no-
tated.329  Courts may have intuited that individuals lack a secrecy inter-
est in their utterances because they are not protected by any source of 
property law—real or intellectual. 
Nevertheless, the emerging and future ability to detect utterances 
in the brain may challenge the fixation requirement in copyright,330 
which may then affect whether a Fourth Amendment secrecy interest 
should apply to utterances.  In the hypothetical motorist stop, the po-
lice could evoke uttered responses from the motorist while she is held 
in brief detention during a Terry-like stop.  Equipped with brain-based 
lie detection technology,331 the police could ask if she had been drink-
ing or was the terrorist they sought.  Even if the motorist remained 
silent, neuroimaging technology could one day enable the police to 
gain accurate answers to their questions.  And if researchers succeed in 
commercializing remote EEG detection technology, then the police 
could administer an on-the-spot brain-based lie detection test during 
interrogations.  Using similar neuroimaging devices, the police could 
intercept and record the memories brought to her mind. 
The police could even “eavesdrop” on the motorist’s inward con-
versations.  While stopped, the motorist might ruminate over her even-
ing and consciously delight in her earlier drinking and misdeeds.  If 
the police use sense-enhanced neuroimaging technology to intercept 
these ruminations, they may intrude upon both her secrecy and seclu-
sion interests in her thoughts. 
Courts and scholars in intellectual property law have begun to rec-
ognize that neuroscience may impact the concept of fixation in copy-
right law.  In Blue Pearl Music Corp. v. Bradford, for example, the Third 
Circuit noted that copies of the musical work at issue could exist in the 
defendant “Mrs. Bradford’s head.”332  One scholar used a hypothetical 
 
328 But see Metrano v. Fox Broad. Co., No. 00-02279, 2000 WL 979664, at *4-5 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (holding that the ideas presented in a live, unrecorded television 
pitch meeting were “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” by the accompanying 
“treatment, index cards and tapes,” thus falling within the ambit of federal copyright law). 
329 “[C]horeography that has never been filmed or notated, an extemporaneous 
speech, ‘original works of authorship’ communicated solely through conversations or 
live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical composition improvised or developed 
from memory and without being recorded or written down,” do not receive federal 
copyright protection.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976). 
330 See supra text accompanying notes 291-301. 
331 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
332 728 F.2d 603, 606 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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case of a musical or spoken performance given to an individual with 
photographic or otherwise perfect memory to argue that “[i]f the 
brain is a computer,” then the person with perfect memory seeing the 
performance would fix it.333  If copyright is meant to protect the ex-
pressive work of the author’s brain and such expressive content can be 
reproduced directly from her brain, then neurological memory may 
satisfy the purpose and requirements of fixation.  These interesting 
and emerging issues in copyright law may challenge whether and to 
what extent a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in secrecy attaches to 
uttered evidence. 
Irrespective of how the debate over fixation resolves, there is a vast 
difference between audible voluntary utterances and silent utterances 
in the brain.  When a suspect remains silent and chooses not to share 
her thoughts, she has not yielded any privacy interest in secluding her 
utterances.  When balancing government interests against the fortress 
of seclusion around the brain, only extraordinary circumstances 
should justify an intrusion upon the seclusion of those utterances.  
This conclusion follows naturally from the oft-repeated claim that the 
Fourth Amendment is, at the least, a safeguard from the government 
“probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts.”334 
IV.  SECRET DETAILS 
Recognizing authors’ secrecy interest in their writings and intangi-
ble effects broadens the sources of privacy secured by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Adding an intellectual property metaphor to the Court’s 
privacy-as-property intrusion approach to the Fourth Amendment also 
provides descriptive robustness to explaining when the Court will rec-
ognize a secrecy interest instead of just a seclusion interest for a 
Fourth Amendment complainant.  But while descriptively sound, the 
approach may fall short of protecting the kinds of secrets that individ-
uals care deeply about in the information age.  Indeed, much of the 
information that individuals may wish to keep secret involves the traces 
of their everyday and intimate activities—the until-now overlooked 
category of automatically generated information.  The collection and 
 
333 David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 43 (1996). 
334 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); see also id. (“Fingerprinting in-
volves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an 
interrogation or search.”). 
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use of such automatically generated information enables the govern-
ment to obtain personally invasive, intimate details about individuals. 
On the one hand, the Court’s implicit reliance upon common law 
copyright protections has broadened the secrecy interest that individ-
uals enjoy when determining whether violations of their Fourth 
Amendment interests have occurred.  This holds normative appeal in 
that the originality and not just the labor of authors are recognized in 
such a system.335  Moreover, a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in 
letters, casual correspondence, and personal musings gives individuals 
autonomy over their own personalities—a copy of which they mani-
fested in their expressions.336  When an author creates, “he does more 
than bring into the world a unique object having only exploitive possi-
bilities; he projects into the world part of his personality and subjects it 
to the ravages of public use.”337  Fourth Amendment protection of such 
secrets safeguards individuals in the “[t]houghts, emotions, and sensa-
tions” that personality itself comprises.338 
On the other hand, one might also think that an essential part of 
her personality is the ability to lead a private life as well as the ability to 
form personal relationships beyond the scrutiny of the government, 
including keeping secret one’s comings and goings and movements 
throughout society, whether via the Internet or via automobile.  This 
kind of secrecy concerning the intimate details of one’s life, which 
could be reconstructed by aggregating automatically generated infor-
mation, may be essential to personality and human flourishing. 
It was this privacy interest that Justice Sotomayor focused on in her 
concurrence in Jones when she stated, 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.  And the Government’s unrestrained power to as-
semble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.  
The net result is that . . . making available at a relatively low cost such a 
 
335 See Post, supra note 138, at 660 (“[W]hen pressed upon the exact nature of the 
labor involved in intellectual production, the common law was apt to speak . . . of 
originality as the true grounds of the title of the property.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
336 Id. at 662.  This idea resonates with the Hegelian personality theory and deonto-
logical justifications for legal protection.  See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright 
and Free Expression:  Analyzing the Convergence of Conflicting Normative Frameworks, 4 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 45, 56-63 (2004). 
337 Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right:  A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors 
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940). 
338 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 195. 
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substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track . . . may “alter 




To determine the reasonableness of such searches, she would ask 
whether individuals expect that the government could use automatically 
generated information to “ascertain, more or less at will, their political 
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”340  And yet she under-
stood that such expectations of privacy would only be recognized by 
the Fourth Amendment if the Court departed from its traditional re-
quirement that a property interest have been intruded upon for a 
Fourth Amendment search to have occurred.341 
Justice Alito’s suggestion that legislatures may be in the best posi-
tion to secure informational privacy can be reconciled with Justice So-
tomayor’s concerns. 342   As Justice Scalia echoed in Jones, Fourth 
Amendment protections are tied to sources of law outside of the Con-
stitution.  Until now, the Court has explicitly relied on trespass upon 
real property interests to define the scope of those interests.  This 
Article illustrates how the Court has also implicitly relied upon intel-
lectual property law to do the same.  Yet the Court has notably ignored 
other sources of state and federal law that may help align Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests to societal expectations of privacy.  The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, for exam-
ple, accords to individuals a privacy interest in their health records,343 
even though such information is not the real or intellectual property 
of the individual.  Other legislative enactments like the Genetic In-
formation Non-Discrimination Act protect individual privacy in some 
 
339 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., 
concurring)). 
340 Id. 
341 See id. at 957 (“But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitu-
tionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat 
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.  I would not assume that all information voluntari-
ly disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason 
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
342 Id. at 962-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
343 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUM-
MARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3-4 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf; Ken Terry, “Patient 
Privacy—The New Threats,” PHYSICIANS PRAC. (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www. 
physicianspractice.com/display/article/1462168/1588915. 
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forms of identifying information.344  State tort laws protecting against 
the invasion of privacy, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
and other existing legislative enactments may provide additional pri-
vacy guarantees.345  Some of these legislative enactments are directed 
at identifying and memorialized information.  If societal expectations 
of privacy demand protection for automatically generated infor-
mation, new legislative enactments could afford privacy to individuals 
when the government seeks such information.  These legislative en-
actments could serve as objective sources of expectations of privacy 
on which Courts could rely. 
While the Fourth Amendment touchstone arose from intrusion 
upon real property, government intrusion upon the electronic and 
biological traces of criminal suspects have become the focus of mod-
ern Fourth Amendment complainants.  To align the Fourth Amend-
ment with societal expectations of privacy, the Court may need to ex-
expand the sources of law to which it turns beyond real and intellectual 
property law.  In the information age, personality may be tied more 
closely to automatically generated information than it was historically 
when physical seclusion could secure an individual against the prying 
eyes of others.  Modern investigative techniques may violate one’s per-
sonality and cause an individual more “mental pain and distress” than 
she would suffer from an intrusion upon the seclusion of her physical 
space.346  At the heart of personality is an individual’s decision as to 
whether her thoughts, activities, and associations should be private or 
shared with the world.347  Perhaps Justice Alito was right to suggest that 
in the world of rapidly emerging technology, the legislature may be in 
the best position to protect the privacy of individuals.  But when it 
does so, it provides a new source of law which should inform reasona-
ble expectations of privacy in the Fourth Amendment.  
CONCLUSION 
Now that the government can search informational property with-
out physically intruding on tangible property, the contours of individual 
 
344 Elisa Becze, Know Your Patients’ Rights Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimina-
tion Act, ONS CONNECT, Aug. 2011, at 14, 14-15. 
345 See Scott Ness, iBrief, The Anonymous Poster:  How to Protect Internet Users’ Privacy And 
Prevent Abuse, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 008, ¶¶ 9-20, http://www.law.duke.edu/ 
journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2010dltr008.pdf. 
346 Post, supra note 138, at 650 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 196). 
347 Id. at 651-52. 
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interests at stake in modern searches and seizures are of paramount 
concern.  Yet in an era where the government may unobtrusively inter-
cept information from electronic files and communications, including 
some directly from suspects’ brains, the individual interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment could not be any murkier. 
Asking who authored the information sought could solve the cen-
tral conundrum plaguing descriptive accounts of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.  The answer tells us both whose privacy interests and what 
type of privacy interests are protected.  Individuals have a cognizable 
right to nondisclosure of their information when information is 
properly viewed as “their” papers or effects.  Common law and federal 
copyright law confer ownership and exclusive rights to authors, which 
include a right of first publication and a corollary right to nondisclo-
sure.  Until now, Fourth Amendment scholarship has ignored the rel-
evance of these exclusive rights.  But just as the right to exclude others 
from real property implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests, so, 
too, do the exclusive rights of authors.  Real property law secures to 
individuals a privacy interest in seclusion. Intellectual property law 
likewise secures to individuals a privacy interest in secrecy.  This prop-
erty/intellectual property framework aligns individual interest in se-
crecy with whether an individual authored or originated the 
information.  And it respects the existing privacy interest of seclusion 
for information originated by others.  
Together with Incriminating Thoughts, this Article provides a more 
complete description of the procedural protections available to crimi-
nal suspects.348  The Fifth Amendment secures a privilege against com-
pelled evoked utterances, while the Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals against intrusions upon memorialized and uttered infor-
mation.  Identifying information are facts in the world, which one dis-
covers but not does originate.  Automatic evidence arises as a 
byproduct of our everyday activities, but lacks expression by the person 
to whom it pertains.  When a government investigation seeks infor-
mation, the spectrum helps describe the categories of evidence afford-
ed constitutional protection.  For identifying and automatic evidence, 
the government must not unreasonably intrude upon an individual’s 
seclusion.  When memorialized and uttered evidence is sought, the 
government must also balance the secrecy interest of the individual. 
 
348 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 407-08. 
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While descriptively robust, this account of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence reveals a disturbing secret lurking beneath the surface of 
existing doctrine.  An individual can keep a secret only if the secret is 
theirs to keep.  As such, individuals lack any cognizable interest in 
automatically generated information, which is the object of many 
modern government investigations.  The government can obtain auto-
matically generated information about individuals without intruding 
upon any individual property interests—be they real or intellectual.  If 
real and intellectual property law are the only sources to which the 
Court will turn to inform reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
Fourth Amendment, then the very information that individuals wish to 
keep the most private may enjoy no constitutional guarantee. 
Traditional property and intellectual property law provides little 
security to individuals in their persons, papers and effects when the 
secrets sought are stored electronically, are generated automatically, 
or are accessed directly from their brains.  In Jones, Justice Alito pos-
ited that legislatures more easily than courts could secure privacy to 
individuals in an era of rapidly evolving technology.  While undoubt-
edly true, when legislatures do so they create new sources of law upon 
which courts should rely to inform the individual interests at stake in 
government searches and seizures.  This article illustrates how the 
Court has expanded beyond reliance on real property law to also use 
intellectual property law to inform individuals’ expectations of privacy.  
To ensure the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in the information age, the Court should ex-
pand further still to include laws that protect the informational se-
crets of individuals. 
